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Disclaimer 
 
The opinions and views expressed by the authors in this 
report are theirs alone and do not represent the view of any 
funding agencies.  All information in this report is believed 
by the authors to be factually correct, but readers should use 
any information contained herein at their own risk
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Executive Summary - Moore Tornado Report 
This report presents observations, findings, and recommendations from an engineering 
reconnaissance trip following the May 20th, 2013 tornado that struck Moore, Oklahoma.  A team 
of faculty, research scientists, professional engineers, and civil engineering students were tasked 
with investigating and documenting the performance of critical facility buildings and residences, 
(IBC Occupancy Category II, III, and IV), in Moore, OK.  The Enhanced Fujita (EF) 5 tornado 
created a 17-mile long damage swath destroying over 12,000 buildings and killing 24 people.  
The total economic loss from this single event was estimated at $3 billion.  The May 20th tornado 
was the third major tornado to hit Moore in the previous 15 years.   
The primary objectives of this study included describing a methodology for an easily-
reproducible rapid damage assessment, assessing performance of building components, assessing 
performance of above and below ground storm shelters, analyzing how social media can 
positively impact communities in the wake of extreme events, and conducting specialized depth 
studies.  The data and recommendations are presented to support future development and/or 
modification of design guidelines, standards, and the use of social media to mitigate loss caused 
by extreme events.   
Tornado damage is particularly extensive when medium- to large-sized cities with dense 
concentrations of buildings are hit by strong tornados.  Damaging effects from moderate (EF0 to 
EF2) winds may be avoided by following hurricane coastal design guides.  EF0 to EF2 winds 
cover approximately 85% of a damage area that is produced by strong EF4 and EF5 tornados.  
These robust designs are rarely employed for residential construction in tornado-prone areas.  
The mortality rates from tornado events have not decreased in years, while building damage and 
overall economic losses continue to grow.  New methods are needed to improve engineering 
design and construction practices in tornado-prone areas.  In addition, revision of structural 
retrofit practices should be considered for mitigating future losses from tornadoes.  The findings 
from this field study are instrumental in validating recent results on tornado loads from 
laboratory experiments and numerical analyses. 
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On May 26th, 2013 the reconnaissance team arrived in Moore, OK.  Along a series of 
transects perpendicular to the tornado’s path, the team observed a dramatic change in the severity 
of damage from the center of the path towards the edges.  These damage severity profiles were 
used to produce a damage severity contour map of the study area.  In addition to mapping 
damage, in-depth studies were performed to leverage the technical data observed in the field.  
These studies include: the use and performance of storm shelters, performance of building 
materials and construction techniques, progressive failures of residential buildings, and how 
collected data can be used to improve laboratory simulations.  In addition, a detailed aerial 
assessment of damage and debris was also conducted.   
The findings of the assessment team are based on observations over three days spent 
surveying damaged homes and storm shelters in Moore, OK.   
• A geolocation data methodology was developed and tested for use by extreme event 
damage assessment teams to collect, attribute, store, and distribute perishable damage 
data.  
• An analysis of residential storm shelter performance was conducted including above and 
below ground shelters.  The results show that no inspected below ground shelters failed 
from perforation or penetration although these shelters were sometimes found flooded by 
rain and severed water pipes, and in some cases the exits were blocked by debris.  One 
perforation, through an area of poorly consolidated concrete, was observed on an above 
ground insulated concrete form waffle-grid residential shelter.   
• Residential structures in lower wind speed areas were examined and found to fail at 
garage door openings and at connections.  
• The comparison between the damage data from this assessment and total force 
predictions from a laboratory tornado simulator showed promise for lab simulations.  
• Remotely sensed aerial imagery gave an understanding of flow and spreading of debris.  
Using aerial imagery from Moore, it was observed that debris flow is typically 
manifested in thin “streak lines” spreading out from the direction of travel of the storm.  
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All data was geolocated and is stored in electronic format.  A website was created 
(http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/MooreTornado/MooreTornado.html) and is used to disseminate the 
team’s data and findings as well as to aid future researchers interested in the tornado damage 
data collected.  The team received funding for travel and lodging from the National Science 
Foundation.  
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Chapter 1 - May 20th 2013 Moore Oklahoma Tornado Overview  
On May 20th, 2013, an Enhanced Fajita (EF) 5 tornado struck the city of Moore, 
Oklahoma.  In addition to over $2 billion in economic loss (NBC News 2013), 24 people were 
killed and over 350 others were injured.  The weather system that produced this tornado formed 
95 tornadoes from May 18th to May 20th, 2013.  In the afternoon hours of May 20th, a supercell 
formed that produced the tornado that struck Moore.  The tornado traveled 17 miles across rural 
farmlands and dense urban areas and at its widest the tornado created a 1.3 mile wide swath of 
destruction.  Wind speeds were estimated at a maximum of 210 miles per hour, the highest in 
that area since the 1999 Bridge Creek-Moore Tornado which registered winds of 317 miles per 
hour (Weather Underground, 2013).  
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service 
(NOAA/NWS) Storm Prediction Center issued a weather warning for May 20th stating that the 
development of supercells was a large risk based on weather conditions (Storm Prediction 
Center, 2013).  At 1:17 a.m. CDT, an update was issued that stated the risk of severe 
thunderstorm development and a risk of a strong isolated tornado in the region surrounding 
Interstate 44, which included the Oklahoma City Metropolitan area.  Tornado watch 191 was 
issued at 1:10 p.m. CDT by the Storm Prediction Center for central and eastern areas of 
Oklahoma and described the threat of a few isolated strong tornadoes in that area.  The National 
Weather Service in Norman, Oklahoma issued a tornado warning for the storm at 2:40 p.m. 
CDT.  The tornado touched down at 2:56 p.m. CDT in Grady County, southwest of Moore and 
4.4 miles west of Newcastle, Oklahoma.  The tornado stayed on the ground for almost 40 
minutes, lifting at 3:35 p.m. CDT 4.8 miles east of Moore.  Figure 1.1 shows the radar imagery 
of the tornado and parent supercell.  The National Weather Service and local news stations 
warned residents to find a safe place such as a basement or storm shelter after the warning was 
broadcast.   
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Figure 1.1, Radar imagery of the movement of the Moore, Oklahoma tornado.  The pink triangle 
indicates the location of the tornado, while the white circle indicates Moore (modified from NWS 
2013). 
Moore has been hit by several large tornadoes in the past two decades, including an F5 
tornado on May 3, 1999, an F4 tornado on May 8, 2003, and the EF5 tornado on May 20, 2013.  
Figure 1.2 shows the approximate paths of these three dangerous tornadoes.  The 1999 tornado 
caused 36 deaths and 295 injuries, and its path was 38 miles long and up to 1 mile wide 
according to the National Weather Service (National Weather Service, 2013).  This was one of 
the strongest tornadoes to hit a densely populated area and resulted in over $1 billion in property 
damage and received significant attention from engineers in America (Marshall, 2002; Gardner 
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et al, 2000; Pan et al, 2002).  The May 2013 tornado crossed the path of the 1999 tornado near 
the intersection of S May Ave and SW 149th St., a rural intersection to the southwest of the 
residential areas in the city of Moore as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2, Map of the paths of the three major tornadoes to hit Moore in the past 15 years with 
the May 20th, 2013 tornado shown in green (kfor, 2013).  
The 2003 tornado caused no deaths, but 45 injuries were reported.  The 2003 tornado 
took a northeast path through Moore.  The 2013 tornado came close to the path of the 2003 
tornado near the intersection of SW 4th St and N Santa Fe Ave. 
The 2013 tornado affected mostly residential and light commercial areas, moving in an 
east-northeast direction through Moore as shown in Figure 1.2.  An overview map of Oklahoma, 
Cleveland County, and the approximate 2013 tornado path is shown in Figure 1.3.  A detailed 
map of Moore and the study area, along with the extents of the 2013 tornado damage path are 
shown in Figure 1.4.  The major roads affected by the 2013 tornado included Santa Fe Avenue, 
Telephone Road, Interstate 35, and Eastern Avenue that run in a north-south direction, and 19th 
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Street and 4th Street running in an east-west direction.  A freight line running parallel to 
Interstate 35 in Moore was also crossed by the tornado path. 
 
Figure 1.3, Map of Cleveland County, extracted from county map of Oklahoma along with the 
approximate path of the May 20th tornado shown by the line and the area studied by the research 
team in the hatched region. 
 
Figure 1.4, View of the Moore, Oklahoma inspection area street map with the damage boundary 
of the May 20th tornado. 
 8 
 
The city of Moore is in Cleveland County.  It is in the greater Oklahoma City 
metropolitan area and has a population of 57,810, making it the seventh largest city in the state 
of Oklahoma (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  The May 20th 2013 tornado damaged or destroyed a 
reported 12,000 homes and 33,000 people were displaced or affected (Tulsa World, 2013).  The 
study area is mostly comprised of single-family neighborhoods of single- and multi-story homes 
and light commercial structures such as restaurants and strip malls.  The local hospital, Moore 
Medical Center, was in the path of the tornado and acted as a shelter for approximately 100 
employees, 30 patients, and between 250 and 300 community members (Norman Transcript, 
2013).  Plaza Towers Elementary School and Briarwood Elementary School were heavily 
damaged by the tornado. 
The city of Moore consists of around 21,000 housing units.  According to the 2010 
census, 73% of these units are single family homes.  Fewer than one percent of these homes were 
built before World War II, 16% were built in the 60’s, 53% of the homes in Moore were built 
between 1970 and 1989, and 36% were built since 1990 as shown in Figure 1.5.  Most of the 
houses in Moore have between 4 to 7 rooms, with an average of 3 bedrooms as shown in Figure 
1.6.     
 
Figure 1.5, Housing unit construction in Moore, Oklahoma based on decade built (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012).  
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Figure 1.6, Housing stock percentages in Moore based on (a) number of rooms and (b) number 
of bedrooms (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). 
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1.1 Report Organization 
This report is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 presents an overview of the May 
20th, 2013 tornado including the path across the city of Moore as well as a summary of the 
building stock.  A description of the data collection methodology used by the reconnaissance 
team is presented in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 presents the social science findings from studying the 
effects of social media on early warning, response, and data collection methods.  A study of 
above and below ground safe rooms inspected in Moore is presented in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 
presents how tornado debris modeling was used in Moore.  Chapter 6 contains in-depth studies 
conducted by the reconnaissance team.  Chapter 7 provides summary conclusions about the 
research conducted by the reconnaissance team and how the research can be used to prepare and 
respond to these disasters going forward.   
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Chapter 2 - Inspection Methodology 
This project investigated and documented damage and failure modes of wood-frame 
structures, inspected above- and below-ground storm shelters to evaluate performance, and 
studied the use of social media in the aftermath of the May 20th, 2013 tornado that struck Moore, 
OK.  Data collected for this study included geolocated photographs, information for in-depth 
studies, aerial basemaps of the inspection area from before and after the tornado, and ground-
based Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) scans.  Typically, this data was collected along 
transects that crossed the tornado path perpendicularly.  In addition to data that was actively 
collected by team members in the field, data was collected passively in the background 
throughout this investigation.  Passively collected data consisted of vehicle-based photographs, 
Global Position System (GPS) tracks, and photographs that were mined from Twitter and 
geotagged within the study area.   
The study employed a data fusion method based on time and space synchronization.  The 
information gathered was temporal as well as spatial.  Photographs were taken through 
instantaneous sensing, and GPS tracks were taken over time.  A method to link these two types 
of data was employed.  Using Geographic Information System (GIS) technology, the time and 
date of the collected photographs were correlated with the spatial location of the GPS unit at that 
same time, which allows for the data to be mapped to the location where the photograph was 
taken.  This robust spatial-temporal dataset can be viewed, accessed, and downloaded from the 
internet.   
2.1 Data Collection Methodology 
Field data collection activities were conducted from May 27 through May 29, 2013, with 
extra data being collected in the following days and months by local members of the inspection 
team. The evening before field data collections activities began, the damage assessment team 
assembled and discussed the objectives of the study and planed the overall reconnaissance 
strategy.   Key items of interest to be documented by all team members were described and 
discussed.  These items included: building scale Enhanced Fujita (EF) damage rating, storm 
shelters, shear walls, hurricane clips and straps, identifiable debris displacement, and impacted 
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storm water infrastructure.  Having all team members collect all items of interest produced a very 
robust dataset in the limited time spent in the field.    
Daily data collection activities included synchronizing time kept on the GPS units and 
time kept on digital cameras, collecting photographs for EF scale damage ratings, visiting sites of 
above- and below-ground storm shelters, and collecting photos of other items of interest.  Every 
night the team gathered to compile, geolocate, and rate photographs.  GIS maps were created 
each night that showed areas that were inspected.  These maps were used to plan the next day’s 
inspection activities.  In these planning meetings, the team also decided upon special-interest 
locations to perform detailed studies.  Mined photos from Twitter were also located on GIS maps 
and used as points of interest to visit.  
During field data collection each day, the damage assessment team would divide into 
groups of 4 or 5 members, and walk transects that ran roughly perpendicular to the path of the 
tornado, starting and ending in areas where no damage was visible.  This yielded multiple paths 
across the tornado damage area and showed different damage widths and gradients.  Team 
members who had an iPhone were able to track each other’s location in the field by using the 
Find Your Friends application.  A screen shot of the application being used in Moore is shown in 
Figure 2.1.   
 
Figure 2.1 Screenshot of the Find Your Friends iPhone application used by the damage 
assessment team in Moore. 
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The main study area for the inspection team was a five-mile long section of the tornado 
path in Moore reaching from Western Avenue on the west to Sunnylane Road on the east.  GPS 
units recorded the movements of team groups within the study area each day.  Figure 2.2 shows 
the damage path created by the tornado as well as the tracks from the GPS units.  Tracks from 
the first day (05-27-2013) are shown in blue, tracks from the second day are shown in red, and 
tracks from the third day are shown in green on Figure 2.2.   
 
Figure 2.2, Map showing locations of all tracks where pictures were taken during the Moore 
Tornado study. 
Cameras and GPS units were synchronized each morning by taking a picture of the GPS 
unit screen showing satellite time.  This allowed for the time difference between each camera 
and GPS unit to be calculated.  Using custom software developed at The University of Alabama 
called Time-Image Positioning Software (TIPS), a data file was created which correlated the 
location of every photo taken to a position in a GPS track.  This data file was uploaded to a GIS 
software package, which showed the locations of each photo on a basemap of Moore.  Pictures 
taken with smart phones or on GPS enabled cameras did not need to be correlated with a GPS 
track.  These photos have the location automatically embedded in the metadata of the photo.  
These photos were also added to the GIS map.  All pictures were hyperlinked to photo locations.  
Hyperlinking of photos allows for a photo to be viewed by selecting a location on the GIS map.    
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Photograph analysis took place each evening when the team returned from data collection 
activities.  The reconnaissance team was divided into two member groups and given a copy of 
the Enhanced Fujita Scale document developed by Texas Tech University (Texas Tech, 2006) 
along with photographs taken by different team members.  A spreadsheet was also provided with 
the name of each photograph, the latitude and longitude location of each photo, and columns to 
record damage ratings and items of interest in the photograph.  Using the EF scale document as a 
guide, each group looked at photographs and rated the degree of damage of a building.  Only one 
photo of each building was rated.  This methodology was used by inspection teams following the 
Tuscaloosa and Joplin tornadoes in the summer of 2011.    
As photographs were analyzed for building damage, items of interest were noted as an 
attribute to the photo.  An “Item” column in the spreadsheet that would receive a number if the 
picture contained an item of interest: (1) storm shelter, (2) impacted stormwater infrastructure, 
(3) building connections, (4) shear wall, or (5) other interesting items.  By coding the 
photographs with items of interest researcher can quickly query the database and locate 
information that pertains to specific research objectives.   
After all photographs were analyzed, individual spreadsheets were combined and the end 
result was a single spreadsheet that contained columns for photograph name, latitude, longitude, 
degree of damage, item, photographer, date, and EF rating.  The EF rating came from a 
correlation between the degree of damage expected wind speed and the EF wind speed.  Each 
degree of damage is given an upper and lower boundary wind speed, as well as an expected wind 
speed.  EF ratings are based on an upper and lower wind speed.  The inspection team used a 
correlation between the expected wind speed of the degree of damage and the range of wind 
speeds given by the EF scale.   
Additional ground level damage photos and low-oblique aerial photos of the damaged 
area were found on the FEMA website (FEMA, 2013).  FEMA ground level damage photos were 
used in areas where the inspection team did not collect photographs.  The photos were 
downloaded from the FEMA website and the same approach used to rate team member photos 
was used to rate FEMA photos.  Although FEMA ground level photos were employed in the 
analysis and for contouring of wind speeds, a separate layer in the GIS map was created to 
display the FEMA ground level photos.   
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FEMA low aerial oblique photos were also downloaded, located on the GIS map, and 
used by the team.  Arrows were added to the low-oblique photograph location to show the 
direction the camera was pointing when the picture was taken.   
2.2 Field Equipment  
Data collected in the field were captured using GPS units, digital cameras, smart phone 
cameras, and a ground-based Light Detecting And Ranging (LiDAR) laser scanner, as well as 
field measurements, sketches, and text descriptions of damage.  GPS data was collected using 
Delorme GPS units including a PN-20, 2 PN-40s, and a PN-60.  Smart phones and GPS digital 
cameras also captured GPS location as well as photos.  The location accuracy of the units varied 
depending on unit, satellite orientation, and obstructions between satellites and units.  The 
Delorme units were typically accurate within 10 m, as were the GPS cameras.  The smart phones 
ranged in accuracy from 10 m to approximately 100 meters.  Delorme GPS data was converted 
from the proprietary data storage method into a standard Geographic Exchange (GPX) format in 
order for the Time Image Positioning software to read the data.  Photographs taken by the 
inspection team using digital cameras and smart phones were stored in a JPG format.     
2.3 Field Data Collection Locations 
Over 3000 photos were collected, cataloged, and geolocated as part of this data 
reconnaissance effort in the aftermath of the May 20th, 2013 tornado that struck Moore, OK.  
When the photograph rating process was complete, all photographs were mapped using the GPS 
tracks, the TIP program, or by using the embedded metadata from the smart phones and GPS 
cameras.  Figure 2.3 shows the locations of all geo-tagged photographs.   
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Figure 2.3, Map showing all geo-located photos colored by the day the pictures were taken. 
Figure 2.4 shows a map with photos distinguished by EF rating.  Degree of damage for 
the residential sectors of Moore ranged from no damage to EF4 level winds.  As would be 
expected, the higher EF ratings are observed nearer to the center of the damage path and lower 
ratings are observed farther away from the center of the path.  A damage contour map was 
created in GIS by interpolating between the EF-rated photos.  The contour map of EF rating is 
shown in Figure 2.5.  Table 2.1 provides the area of each EF rating as well as the percentage of 
damage that the EF rating represents.  
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Figure 2.4, Map showing the EF rated photographs taken in Moore. 
 
Figure 2.5, Contour map of EF wind speeds based on observed building damage. 
It should be noted that the maximum expected wind speed for One- and Two- Family 
Residencies for a degree of damage rating of 10 “Destruction of engineered and/or well-
constructed residence; slab swept clean” is 200 mph.  An EF5 rating is over 200 mph; therefore, 
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by evaluating only wood framed constructed buildings in this study, an EF4 rating is the 
maximum rated photo and contour that can be achieved as shown on Figures 2.4 and 2.5.    
Table 1.1, Areas and percentages of EF ratings in the inspection area. 
EF Rating Area (Acres) Percentage 
EF0 378 27.6% 
EF1 495 36.1% 
EF2 293 21.4% 
EF3 116 8.5% 
EF4 88 6.4% 
Total 1370  
2.4 GIS-Based Interactive Web Map 
The interactive web map containing the geo-located photographs taken while in Moore 
can be viewed at http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/MooreTornado/MooreTornado.  In addition to the 
photographs, the web map also contains pre-and post-tornado aerial images, filters which allow 
the user to view photographs in categories such as storm shelter or crowd sourcing, the tornado 
contour map, and low aerial oblique photographs obtained from FEMA at the website 
http://fema.maps.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html. 
2.5 3D Data Collection with Laser Scanning Technology 
Terrestrial laser scanning technology was also employed for damage data collection.  
Terrestrial laser scanning is a robust technology used to collect 3D data with high precision and 
resolution.  The position (x,y,z) of millions of points in a space are identified by a scanner 
through the reflection of a laser beam.   The points are then reproduced to make a 3D virtual 
scene known as a point cloud.  Some scanners include a built-in camera that allows the 
superposition of the true color to each point of the collected point cloud.  Terrestrial scanners can 
produce dense point clouds in which the distances between measured points can be less than 5 
centimeters.  A 3D point cloud of damaged areas in the aftermath of a tornado enables remote 
engineers to virtually inspect damaged buildings.  The rich and precise 3D information provided 
by scanners can potentially allow engineers to return to the virtual damage scene later for further 
investigations without missing perishable evidence.  
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Point cloud data was collected by a stationary scanner from two areas with two different 
scanning settings.  Figure 2.6 shows the location of the scanned areas along the tornado path.  
The first dataset was collected from Eastmoore Ct area enclosed by a red rectangle, which 
includes several rows of buildings.  In this area, the scanner was moved to several locations 
including both in the front yard and back yard of the buildings.  Also, the built-in camera of the 
scanner was used to take panoramic images.  The second dataset was collected from South 
Bouziden Dr, enclosed by a blue rectangle shown in Figure 2.6.  In this area the scanner was 
used to scan the site from several locations but only on the street centerline.  This scanning 
setting was selected to simulate scanning with mobile scanners that are mounted on vehicles.  In 
addition, the built-in camera was not used in the second scenario.  Therefore, data collection in 
this area was faster and easier, though the collected point cloud dataset includes neither the back 
side of buildings nor the true color.   
Once captured in the field, the collected data was pre-processed using point cloud 
processing software and prepared for virtual damage analysis.  Common points in separate scans 
such as roof or wall corners were identified and used to register individual scans together and  
 
Figure 2.6, Location of the scanned areas along the tornado path  
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produce a complete 3D point cloud of the two sites.  The panoramic images were employed to 
superimpose the true color to the first point cloud dataset.  Animations that show the two 3D 
point cloud datasets are accessible at the project GIS website (http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/ 
MooreTornado/MooreTornado.html).  The point cloud datasets were also imported and geo-
referenced into the GIS database as an additional layer of data. 
2.6 Virtual Damage Investigation 
Generated 3D point clouds of the damaged areas were employed to virtually investigate 
damage of buildings.  The 3D nature of the scenes allows the investigator to navigate through the 
3D scene, rotate or move the point of view, zoom in, or zoom out.  This helps to properly 
understand the overall condition of the site and identify the location of the tornado path.  Figure 
2.7 illustrates a cross section of the second point cloud, which shows the damaged buildings on 
the west side of Bouziden Drive.  The figure shows that damage gradually increases from the 
low damage at either end of the scan (south and north) to the total destruction at the center where 
the tornado has passed.    
 
Figure 2.7, Point cloud of damaged buildings at west side of the Bouziden Drive and the 
tornado path. 
Damage of individual buildings at the two sites was also virtually investigated and rated.  
To meet this goal a list of wind damage metrics was prepared based on wind damage 
descriptions of the Enhanced Fujita (EF) scale.  Damage metrics included loss of roof or wall 
covering, broken glass of windows, failure of garage doors or walls, uplift of roof decks, failure 
of large section of roofs, failure of exterior or interior walls, and slab swept clean.  The point 
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cloud of each building was investigated to detect those damage metrics. Figure 2.8 shows point 
clouds of three buildings and some detected wind damage metrics.  Once the damage of each 
building was analyzed, an EF rate was assigned to the building based on the EF scale.  Figure 2.9 
and Figure 2.10 show the aerial view of damaged areas and results of the EF rating.  Table A1 in 
the appendix presents the detailed results of the damage assessment and EF ratings for all 
individual buildings.   
 
Figure 2.8, Point cloud of three damaged buildings and detected wind damage metrics. 
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Figure 2.9, Aerial images and EF rates of the area #1: (a) pre-tornado image and building IDs; 
(b) post-tornado image and EF rates. 
 
Figure 2.10, Aerial images and EF rates of the area #2: (a) pre-tornado image and building IDs; 
(b) post-tornado image and EF rates. 
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2.7 Automated Damage assessment 
Collected point clouds were used to test and validate the automated damage assessment 
tool developed by Kashani et al. (2013).  This tool incorporates the 3D point cloud of damaged 
areas with pre-tornado aerial images and automatically identifies and compares pre- and post-
tornado shapes of roofs and walls to quantify building damage.  Figure 2.11 illustrates the roof 
and wall surfaces identified by the tool for the point cloud of buildings number 6 - 15 shown in 
Figure 2.9(a).  Building number 11, shown with hatch area in Figure 2.9, had been cleaned up 
before the data collection.  Therefore, the GIS tool did not identify any roof or wall surfaces 
associated with building 11. 
 
Figure 2.11, generated roof polygons and wall polylines with the GIS tool developed by Kashani 
et al. (2013). 
2.8 Inspection Methodology Conclusions 
The data collection methodology employed in this study successfully collected, 
geolocated, analyzed, and displayed information related to the May 20th 2013 Moore OK 
tornado.  Techniques that were introduced and employed in past tornado events were again used 
to collect a robust data set that is available on the internet at http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/ 
MooreTornado/MooreTornado.  In addition, study specific attribute information such as storm 
shelters, shear walls, storm water infrastructure, etc. was collected and cataloged to enhance the 
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value of this data set.  Mined social media data in the form of geolocated photos were also 
included in this study and used to locate features such as storm shelters within the damage 
extents.   
This study also indicated that laser scanning technology can be used to preserve 
perishable damage data and perform virtual damage assessment and EF rating in the aftermath of 
tornadoes.  In addition, the scanning of damaged buildings from the street without taking 
panoramic photos is an efficient way to collect 3D data for EF rating.  Panoramic photos and 
back yard scans can improve the visual quality of the collected point cloud, however these 
datasets are not necessary for EF rating.  Employing a mobile scanner mounted on a vehicle can 
speed up and facilitate the data collection procedure.  This study also indicated the potential of 
laser scanning technology for automated damage assessment.  
  
 25 
 
Chapter 3 - Social Media Data Mining 
Engagement of society through social media is a key component of this research.  
Passively mining social media provided many spatially located photos that were used to direct 
the field data collection activities.  Actively tweeting after the tornado and asking for engineering 
items of interest such as storm shelters, safe rooms, and homes built after 1999 allowed the 
research team to engage citizen sensors in the data collection process.  These activities utilize 
citizens as sensors and promoted thought and discussion about infrastructure in relationship to 
tornado preparedness.  Having social scientists on the team, allowed for new and creative ways 
to educate society.  Utilizing social media to tweet information after this study will also educate 
society about improved building practice for tornado resiliency.   
3.1 Mechanics of Mining Social Data 
For this study, social science researchers were tasked with providing social media data to 
the on-site team to augment on-site visual documentation and to provide coordinates for specific 
types of visual data collection.  Two types of data collections were undertaken, passive and 
active social media data collection. 
3.2 Passive Social Media Data Collection 
 In passive social media data collection, messages from the Moore, Oklahoma area 
were collected via Twitter, a micro-blogging social media network.  A software system 
developed by the Social Science Research Center at Mississippi State University, the Social 
Media Tracking and Analysis System (SMTAS) was used to collect the data.  The social media 
team collected geo-located tweets from May 21 to May 29.  Figure 3.1 shows the daily volume 
of tweets captured in Moore during this period. 
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Figure 3.1,  The Daily Data Volume of Tweets, 5-21-13 to 5-19-13. 
The data collection plan used an 11 miles x5 miles (55 square mile) sized bounding box 
along the tornado path to spatially filter tweets.  The total number of geo-located tweets from the 
bounding box was 5022 tweets.  Tweets were a primary form of communication in the early days 
of the event as cell communication was turned off and reserved for first responders.  Texts and 
tweets were still working.  These tweets were analyzed for relevant images and 157 tweets were 
sent to the engineering team.  Figure 3.2 shows a map of tweets from the Moore area. 
 
Figure 3.2, Map of Tweets from Moore, OK 
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The engineers used the images to find the exact coordinates of specific types of damage 
and the locations of storm shelters while on-site in Moore.  With these images, the engineers 
taking pictures of locations were able to document the amount of clean up that had occurred 
between when the time the image appeared on Twitter and when the team reached the site.  The 
Twitter images collected were also used in combination with the on-site images to develop the 
online interactive map of the damage locations. 
Also, the social media team was able to match selected images of the structures with 
existing images of Google Street View prior to the tornado to observe different time points 
relevant to the damage.  This provided structural images shortly after the tornado and from 
engineers doing their assessments.  This level of documentation allowed the engineers to more 
accurately and comprehensively interpret the impacts of the event.  This proved to be a 
successful and cost-efficient way to collect and expand visual documentation.  Figure 3.3 shows 
comparison images. 
 
Figure 3.3, Comparison of damaged home (a) pre- and (b) post-demolition 
(a) 
(b) 
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3.3 Active Social Media Data Collection  
The social media team used the passive data collection phase to identify Twitter users 
frequently posting images from the Moore area.  The team contacted these Twitter users to 
request specific types of visual documentation, such as the location of storm shelters and to also 
have them request their followers to send their tweet images.  These images were sent with GPS 
coordinates to the on-site engineering team for investigation.  This allowed for collection of data 
to document social barriers to home hardening, safe rooms, and storm shelters.  By asking for 
images of particular types of damage, safe rooms, and storm shelters, the engineering team was 
able to collect enough field data to draw conclusions about how well homes were built, and how 
well safe rooms and different types of storm shelters withstood the storm.  
During this process, the social media team was able to identify the types of individuals 
most likely to assist with data collection.  News reporters documenting the event and storm 
chasers were the most willing to assist in providing information requested.  See Figure 3.4 
obtained through the active social media data collection. 
 
Figure 3.4, Picture of local shelter obtained from active social media data collection. 
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3.4 Social Media Conclusions 
The use of social media analysis in this study demonstrated the capacity to track social 
media at a potential storm site as soon as the National Weather Service releases warnings.  This 
tracking can continue during and after the storm.  Using geo-located tweets within the boundary 
areas of a storm will allow real-time data collection of damage locations.  This permits actual 
damage assessment personnel, such as the National Weather Service, to locate damage locations 
immediately.  Having the image immediately permits locating the damage more easily, and also 
helps determine if the location has been modified by the time research and damage assessment 
personnel reach the location.  
Active social media data collection has much potential.  This study indicates that 
volunteer groups are a likely group to help determine damage locations and send tweets.  
However, it was quickly learned that volunteer groups are there to volunteer and they do not 
have much interest in tweeting about damage.  The social media team analyzed the senders of the 
passive tweets to determine other groups that might be more likely to assist.  News reporters and 
storm chasers were obtaining and disseminating the most images.  When they were approached 
for assistance, they were more than willing to share their tweets and images, as well as to 
disseminate the request to their followers, which grew the tweet count and images.  This led to 
the conclusion that for future studies, citizen sensor requests should be directed to and 
disseminated through news reporters and storm chasers, as well as other “experts” on damage 
imaging.  Such groups include structural engineers, professional photographers, amateur/ham 
radio operators, and storm spotters.  
The use of social media in research of this nature will allow the public and particular 
expert groups within the public to serve as citizen sensors in the research process.  In essence, 
the public can have a useful purpose in their social media activities relative to a severe weather 
disaster.  This will allow researchers to begin collecting data immediately and to be able to geo-
locate that data for field work.  Social media will also reduce the time and resources needed by 
the field team to locate the work themselves when they arrive at the location.  They can mobilize 
with a plan to reach particular locations quickly.  Once on the scene, researchers can use active 
social media solicitations to obtain more images and information about items of interest.  The 
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research team is essentially expanding the number of “boots on the ground” with the inclusion of 
the citizen sensors. 
Another benefit of the citizen sensor data collection methodology is that researchers can 
also immediately share this data with other researchers and disaster response professionals who 
also need this time sensitive data.  Response and recovery teams, weather service personnel, 
utility crews, and even volunteer groups can use this data to direct their efforts more efficiently. 
Future studies will be able to explore the use of citizen sensors with the inclusion of more 
“expert” users to provide specific images and information.  As this network grows, the intent is 
to also conduct studies where the “expert” citizen sensors have been pre-identified and already 
know their role in the research process.  They can begin the data collection and dissemination 
process immediately.  This will be relatively easy to do with storm chasers who are already in 
proximity to severe weather situations.  Other “expert” citizens can be pre-identified in storm 
prone regions and they can also start their work immediately when an event occurs in their 
region.  This will allow for more immediate data collection and also collection of data that these 
expert citizen sensors know is needed by the various end-users. 
These citizen sensor social media networks that are grown with the continuation of 
citizen sensor inclusion will also permit the dissemination of knowledge back to the public about 
the outcomes of the research.  Through social media, the public will become more aware of the 
types of research being done, what the issues are, what is being learned, and how this knowledge 
might serve them.  In future studies, the dissemination of research outcomes through the citizen 
sensor networks will be tested and evaluated. 
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Chapter 4 - Residential Shelter Performance  
One goal of the research team was to study the effects of any building practice changes in 
the city of Moore, especially because of the recent occurrence of violent tornadoes.  One facet of 
this investigation focused solely on residential shelter availability and performance.  In the 2011 
tornadoes that hit Tuscaloosa, Alabama and Joplin, Missouri, residential shelters were not 
commonly observed, so there was an opportunity to assess whether this trend held true in Moore, 
especially given the city’s recent history of tornadoes. 
It is promising to note that at the time of the tornado, the city of Moore had 3,236 
registered residential shelters (City of Moore, 2013).  The locations of the registered residential 
shelters were obtained by the team after the damage survey and are shown in Figure 4.1 along 
with the locations of shelters observed by the team in the field and the damage boundary.  
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, there are 20,446 housing units in Moore.  Based on the 
number of registered shelters, this would imply that approximately 16% of residential housing 
units have a shelter.  This is an increase in the number of residential shelters observed in the 
aftermath of the 1999 F5 tornado when teams documented approximately 5-10% individual 
residential shelters (Gardner, 2000; Marshall, 2002). 
 
Figure 4.1, Locations of all registered and observed residential shelters in Moore city limits with 
the tornado path indicated by black dashes. 
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4.1 General Storm Shelter Observations 
The term ‘residential shelter’ in this report has been used as a generic term to describe 
hardened locations where people took shelter from the storm.  However, care is taken to 
differentiate between safe rooms, storm shelters, refuges, and safe spots.  A safe room is 
classified as a hardened room built according to FEMA 320 design guidelines.  The majority of 
the designs are above ground (FEMA, 2008).  Secondly, a storm shelter is defined as a location 
either above or below ground which is approved and tested by the National Storm Shelter 
Association (NSSA), but not built to a FEMA recommended design.  The majority of residential 
shelters observed are classified as storm shelters.  In addition, a refuge describes a hardened 
room not built to FEMA guidelines, nor tested by the NSSA, and is often homemade.  Finally, a 
safe spot is a non-hardened room in the interior of a home, typically a closet or bathroom.  Table 
4.1 provides a summary of these definitions.  Furthermore, in this work, consistent with Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) definitions, perforation occurs when projectiles 
breach exterior walls and are able to enter the residential shelter.  Penetration is defined as 
damage to the exterior surface of the residential shelter walls without any perforation occurring 
(FEMA, 2008).   
Table 4.1,  Residential shelter classification. 
Classification Definition 
Residential Shelter 
Safe Room 
Generic term to describe items below 
Built according to FEMA 320 design guidelines 
Storm Shelter Approved and tested by NSSA, but does not fall under a 
FEMA recommended design 
Refuge Hardened room not built to FEMA design guidelines nor 
tested by NSSA 
Safe Spot Non-hardened interior room of a home 
 
Of the 75 residential shelters observed by the assessment team in the damaged area, only 
7 were above ground.  The team relied on being able to observe the residential shelters from 
outside the home, thus, in some cases, shelters may have been present in a home, but were not 
immediately obvious from the outside and could not be documented.  A total of 68 below ground 
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residential shelters were documented by the team with the majority referred to as prefabricated 
concrete or garage slab storm shelters.   
There were 29 documented prefabricated concrete storm shelters within the damage path.  
These shelters were partially raised from the ground (~1/3 of the total height) and had the 
majority of the above ground portion covered with soil and vegetation.  A steel door and 
ventilation spout were on the exposed concrete roof.  A photo of a prefabricated concrete shelter 
is shown in Figure 4.2.  Since these shelters were found outside homes, the assessment teams 
documented many instances where the owners would leave the shelter unlocked and open for 
neighbors to use in case of an emergency as described in more detail below.  The second most 
common type of storm shelters observed were cut into the garage floor slab.  There were over 25 
garage floor shelters seen during the damage surveys with two door types: a sliding door and a 
hinged door.  An example of a sliding door garage floor shelter is shown in Figure 4.3 which 
illustrates that this type of shelter was designed so a car could drive over them to preserve garage 
space.  This type of storm shelter is a quick retrofit to an existing home, requiring approximately 
12-15 hours to install, and allows occupants to enter the shelter without having to go outside into 
the elements.  Although typically positioned behind a parking space, a car may have to be moved 
before occupants are able to enter. 
 
Figure 4.2, Example of a prefabricated concrete storm shelter. 
 34 
 
 
Figure 4.3, Example of a garage slab storm shelter. 
While the majority of the garage slab shelters performed very well, there were some 
issues observed with these shelters.  The first was that garage doors and attached garages often 
fail first during a tornado event (Marshall, 2002).  In these instances, large objects and debris can 
block the doors of garage slab storm shelters.  Figure 4.4 illustrates a garage slab storm shelter 
that was covered by debris after the garage and house collapsed.  It should be noted that although 
debris can cover below ground shelter doors, and occupants may be trapped, first-responders are 
available very quickly after an event and occupants are typically assisted with in a half hour 
since the location of registered residential shelters is known.  Another observation made was that 
in some cases the storm shelters were filled with water caused by heavy rains following storm 
passage or severed water lines in severely damaged homes.  This was documented by the team 
several times with one shelter filling with 0.3 m (1 foot) of water before the occupants were able 
to safely exit the storm shelter.  In the event of debris blocking the exit of the shelter, flooding 
could prove very dangerous to anyone remaining inside the storm shelter.  An example of a 
flooded storm shelter is shown in Figure 4.5.  Floating bottles and bench seats indicate that water 
had reached the top of the safe room.  Another observation, while not directly related to the 
performance of garage slab storm shelters in the tornado, was that many of these shelters were 
left open after the occupants exited and were not closed.  This is a hazard to first responders and 
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clean-up crews in the aftermath of a tornado, especially when the entry to the shelter is obscured 
by debris. 
 
Figure 4.4, Debris blocked storm shelter after an attached garage failed. 
 
Figure 4.5, Flooded storm shelter from severed water lines and rain.  Floating debris indicates 
that water has reached the top of the storm shelter. 
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The majority of the above ground residential shelters observed were found in the 
moderate to severe damage range (EF3 - EF4), mainly because substantial home damage 
exposed the otherwise concealed shelters.  The majority of above ground residential shelters 
performed very well and only had cosmetic damage on the exposed portions of the shelter due to 
debris strikes.  When possible, specifications of the shelter were obtained from the home owner, 
or measurements were taken by team members in the field and used in the evaluation. 
There were two observed instances of concrete or concrete masonry unit (CMU) safe 
rooms that were used as bedroom closets.  Both of these safe rooms were stand alone and had no 
part of the home attached to the walls or ceilings as prescribed by FEMA 320.  The first safe 
room was in an area that experienced EF3 level damage on Riverside Drive in eastern Moore.  
The safe room was built on the southwest corner of the home and is pictured in Figure 4.6. 
Inspection of this safe room indicated that the exterior dimensions were 3 m by 3 m (9.5 feet by 
9.5 feet) and 2.5 m (8 feet) tall.  The door had the FEMA recommended three dead bolts and 
three hinges and ventilation was noted at two locations on the ceiling.  The second 
concrete/CMU safe room, shown in Figure 4.7, was found near the intersection of SW 149th St 
and S. May Ave.  The home experienced EF4 damage with complete removal of the roof, second 
floor, and external walls.  This house was near the intersection of the 1999 and 2013 tornado 
paths.  The property also included a pool cabana, tennis courts, stand-alone garage, and 
greenhouse.  The cabana, garage, and greenhouse were all removed from their foundations and 
blown approximately 45-90 meters (50-100 yards) according to the home owner.  Likewise, trees 
on the property were badly damaged and debarked.  The owner informed the team that he built 
the safe room according to the FEMA 320 specifications current at the time of home construction 
in 2001.  The safe room door did have three dead bolts and hinges and adequate ventilation.  
Even though the home had an above ground safe room, the owner described to the team that his 
family felt safer below ground, so they also had an additional below ground garage slab storm 
shelter installed and were in that shelter when the tornado struck.  Both the above and below 
ground residential shelters at this location performed well.   
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Figure 4.6, FEMA designed CMU safe room found near Riverside Drive in eastern Moore. 
 
Figure 4.7, FEMA designed CMU safe room found near SW 149th St and S. May Ave.  The safe 
room is centrally located among the remaining rooms and is indicated with the black circle. 
Several additional above ground residential shelters, shown in Figure 4.8, are briefly 
discussed below.  There were two instances of steel above ground storm shelters bolted to the 
garage slab.  The first storm shelter was found near the intersection of SW 147th St. and S. 
Hudson Ave in an area of EF3 damage.  The shelter and remnants of the home are pictured in 
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Figure 4.8(a).  The shelter exterior was scratched and buffed from debris impact, but no major 
dent or perforation occurred.  In addition, portions of the home’s roof system fell on top of the 
storm shelter but no major damage was observed.  The second above ground steel storm shelter 
was found at the intersection of SW 13th St and Penn Ln.  This shelter was in an area of EF4 
damage and is shown in Figure 4.8(b).  The exterior of the storm shelter showed signs of 
significant scratching and buffing impact from windborne debris, however, no major damage or 
perforation was observed.  Both of the above ground steel storm shelters successfully met their 
intended purpose. 
 
Figure 4.8, Residential shelter images; (a) and (b) steel storm shelters bolted to the garage slab; 
(c) cylindrical steel exterior storm shelter; and; (d) homemade concrete dome refuge. 
Near SW 151st St and Todd Way in an area of EF0 damage zone, an above ground storm 
shelter was documented by the team.  The shelter had a cylindrical body capped with a dome and 
is shown in Figure 4.8(c).  This type of storm shelter has been tested and approved by National 
Storm Shelter Association (NewDay Tornado Shelters, 2013).  This shelter was made of 8 mm 
(5/16 inch) steel and stood about 2 m (6.5 feet) tall with a diameter of 102 cm (40 inches).  Due 
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to the small footprint, this shelter is not recommended for more than 3 adults (NewDay Tornado 
Shelters, 2013). 
A concrete dome refuge, shown in Figure 4.8(d) that appeared homemade without design 
guidelines was documented by the team.  The dome refuge was found in a neighborhood that 
experienced EF4 damage and was near the intersection of SW 145th St and Briarcliff Dr.  The 
door of the refuge was made of 5 mm (3/16 inch) steel and was 0.9 m (3 feet) tall and 0.6 m (2 
feet) wide.  The concrete exterior was measured at the midsection of the door frame and found to 
be 18 cm (7 inches) thick.  The steel door had three hinges and each hinge was welded to the 
door frame and then welded to a pair of structural steel square tubes that ran across the door 
width.  In addition, three slide barrel bolt locking devices were found on the door.  Although 
homemade, the dome refuge performed very well in the tornado. 
4.2 ICF Safe Room Missile Perforation 
The team documented an insulated concrete form (ICF) house with an ICF safe.  The 
house is located on NW 36th St in Newcastle, Oklahoma, near the touch down location of the 
tornado.  This safe room suffered two missile perforations on the western wall.  The home was 
built in 2001 using ICF waffle grid walls, which are now considered obsolete since flat ICF walls 
are now industry standard (Reward Wall Systems, 2013).  The roof of the house was made of 
metal studs and a 5 × 20 cm (2 × 8 inch) wooden top plate which was attached to the ICF walls 
with anchor J-bolts.  Damage to the home included complete removal of the attached garage 
(built with metal studs) and the roof.  The ICF walls of the house experienced damage from 
debris impact resulting in the removal of some of the foam exterior.  Overall the home was 
estimated to be in a region of EF4 strength wind primarily based on damage to neighboring 
homes.   
The exterior walls of the home were built using the ICF waffle grid design which 
consisted of 3.8 cm (1.5 inches) of foam on the exterior and interior which encapsulated a 
concrete center.  The walls were a total of 23.5 cm (9.25 inches) thick including the exterior and 
interior foam, the concrete core, and the interior sheet rock (Reward Wall Systems, 2013).  The 
concrete fill ranged from a maximum thickness of 15 cm (6 inches) within a cell to a minimum 
thickness of 6.4 cm (2.5 inches) in the thin area between cells.  The centers of the cells were 
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spaced at 30.5 cm (12 inch) increments consistent with FEMA specifications.  Vertical and 
horizontal reinforcing steel was placed in every other cell of the exterior walls (61 cm spacing) 
according to the home owner.  The reinforcing bar was estimated to be approximately No. 4 
rebar (1.3 cm diameter) by the home owner. 
An above ground ICF waffle grid safe room was found at this home.  Although waffle 
grid ICF is no longer an industry standard, ICF waffle grid safe room design is still included in 
the current FEMA 320 guidelines (FEMA, 2008).  This ICF safe room doubled as a storage 
closet.  The safe room measured 2.4 m by 2.6 m (8 feet by 8.67 feet) with walls that were 2.4 m 
(8 feet) tall.  A FEMA recommended door with three dead bolts was used.  An exterior 
schematic of the home showing the location of the safe room and an inset image of the safe room 
are shown in Figure 4.9.  As seen in Figure 4.9, one of the walls of the safe room is also an 
exterior wall. 
 
Figure 4.9, Floor plan of ICF home where failure of an above ground safe room occurred.  An 
exterior image of the safe room is shown as well as the tornado motion.  The red arrow indicates 
the location of perforation by two metal poles. 
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The west exterior wall of the safe room was perforated by two square metal poles shown 
in Figure 4.10(a).  It should be noted that in Figure 4.10(a), only one projectile is shown.  The 
second projectile was removed but evidence of the perforation is indicated by a hole on the right 
side of the image.  The homeowner was seeking shelter in the safe room during the tornado and 
was nearly injured when the poles came through the wall inches from his head.  The poles 
entered the safe room and extended approximately 0.6 m (2 feet) into the room.  Based on 
inspection of the exterior wall of the safe room, it is likely that the poles struck some part of the 
thick cell center and, due to the rounded shape, deflected to the thinner portion of concrete where 
the metal was able to penetrate into the interior of the safe room.  A pole taken from the site 
measured to be approximately 2.5 cm (1 inch) square with a thickness of 0.23 cm (0.09 inches).  
The pole was bent and had a tip to tip length of 99 cm (39 inches) and an arc length of 104 cm 
(41 inches) along the curve.  Detailed images of one of the projectiles are shown in Figure 
4.10(b-d).   
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Figure 4.10, Illustrated is (a) the wind borne projectiles which punctured the ICF safe room wall 
nearly striking the home owner (one projectile has been removed); (b) detailed dimensions of 
one projectile; (c) the end which punctured the wall; and (d) the other end used for thickness 
measurements. 
This particular safe room was built to the FEMA 320 (2008) ICF safe room 
recommended design, although FEMA ICF drawings were not available at the time of home 
construction.  FEMA prescribes the use of #4 horizontal steel reinforcing bar every 40.6 cm (16 
inches) and #5 vertical reinforcing steel every 30.5 cm (12 inches) for the waffle grid safe room 
design.  The exact size of the steel reinforcement is not known; however, since the steel 
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reinforcement was not impacted by the missile, this detail is not considered critical for 
explaining the missile perforation.  
FEMA recommends, but does not require, that safe rooms be built as an interior room of 
the home.  Similar to the idea of an interior closet or bathroom safe spot, it is best to have as 
many walls as possible between a safe room and the exterior of the home.  This typically helps to 
reduce the likelihood of missile impact, penetration, or perforation.  However, since this is not a 
design requirement, safe rooms can have up to three walls exposed to the outside (FEMA, 2008).  
This particular safe room had a single wall coincident with the exterior of the home and this wall 
was on the western portion of the home as shown in Figure 4.9.  Estimates from tornado 
climatology indicate that average tornado motion is from the southwest to the northeast 
(Gonzalez, 2013) causing the southern and western faces of homes to receive the worst brunt of 
tornado impacts.  The safe room location on the west side of the home and having a wall on 
exterior portion of the building were two design components that may have contributed to the 
observed failure.   
Another likely explanation for the failure was issues with workmanship and construction 
quality.  Several large holes and voids were observed in the concrete at the location of the 
perforations as shown in Figure 4.11.  FEMA 320 states that the compressive strength of 
concrete used in safe rooms must be at least 20.7 MPa (3000 psi), however, there is no 
requirement for testing of concrete used in safe room construction.  Concrete compressive 
strength for the safe room that was perforated was estimated using ASTM method C805 (2013) 
and a Soiltest CT-320 concrete test hammer.  The average curves provided with the instrument 
were used to convert the rebound results to compressive strength.  Two locations were examined 
on both the roof and the west wall of the safe room.  Those on the west wall were located 
directly between the missile impact points and at a location with no damage.  For each location, 
the surface of the concrete was smoothed with a carborundum stone and ten readings were taken 
spaced at a minimum of 2.5 cm (1 inch).  The average of the ten readings was then input into the 
curves provided with the instrument in order to determine an estimate of compressive strength.  
Results from the rebound hammer tests indicate a concrete compressive strength of 
approximately 23.4 MPa (3400 psi) for the walls of the safe room and 15.2 MPa (2200 psi) for 
the safe room roof.  The curves used to convert the rebound values to compressive strength were 
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based on average concrete mixtures and curing conditions and have a margin of error of ±20%.  
Considering the margin of error, the measured values indicate that the wall concrete had a 
compressive strength most likely in excess of the 20.7 MPa (3000 psi) specified by FEMA 
(2008).  However, the compressive strength of the safe room roof concrete may have had a 
compressive strength less than the specified minimum.  
 
Figure 4.11, Inadequate concrete pour indicated by; (a) a large area of poorly consolidated 
concrete below missile perforation and (b) a large void in the concrete in the thinned area of the 
waffle grid and in the vicinity of a plastic clip. 
In addition, the location and configuration of the plastic cross ties caused concrete flow 
issues and the actual concrete thickness at the location of missile impact was measured to be 
approximately 2.5 cm (1 inch).  This measurement is less than the FEMA required minimum 
thickness of 5.1 cm (2 inches).  This highlights the point that care must be taken to assure that all 
areas of safe room walls are properly filled with adequate strength concrete and to avoid plastic 
cross ties along the thinned portion of ICF waffle grid safe rooms when possible.   
4.3 Shared Shelter Use 
The social media analysis study of shelters and safe rooms in Moore, OK provided 
insight on how well these structures held up against the strength of tornadic winds and debris 
impact, and also how these structures were used to protect people.  The choices that people made 
to use these structures had a great deal to do with how they survived.  
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The social media data that accompanied the pictures of these shelters and safe rooms 
indicated how shelters had saved lives.  Observations of the shelters revealed that the shelters 
had withstood the tornadic winds and debris impact, and it also appeared that these shelters were 
well used and shared among large numbers of people.  Regardless of the type or age of the 
shelter, families and neighbors shared these small protective fixtures in significant numbers.  
Using an informal neighborhood network of knowledge about the locations of these shelters and 
the open door use of these shelters, people went to the closest shelter and took protection with 
their neighbors.  An example of this type of behavior is shown and described in Figure 4.12.  
Many of the shelters in the Moore tornado event housed multiple neighbors and their pets, in 
several cases, over ten people and their pets took refuge in shared shelters.  This same story was 
told about many shelters observed in Moore.   
 
Figure 4.12, This woman’s family and neighbors sought protection in her shelter.  The woman 
was not home at the time, but called her friends and family and told them to get into the shelter.  
This location is about 100 feet west of the Moore Medical Center and the Warren Theatre, where 
the tornado was at one of its strongest points. 
Through the use of social media data and discussion with people at the site of the 
shelters, researchers were told how people knew which neighbors had shelters and that they were 
welcome to go to those shelters when it became necessary.  In many of the locations in the path 
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of the tornado, there was at least one shelter on a street and in many cases multiple shelters on a 
street.  The age of these shelters also varied.  Some were very old as shown in Figure 4.13 or had 
been constructed by homeowners.  Others were more modern and some were new, many having 
been installed within the last 6 months.  The locations of the shelters also varied with many 
described as below ground and others installed above ground in garages or built into the homes 
as safe rooms.  
 
Figure 4.13, This shelter was one of the older observed shelters in the area. 
Neighbors talked about either going to the closest shelter or at least sending their families 
to those shelters when they could not go.  These shelters filled to a capacity that belied what they 
should be able to hold.  Structures that looked like they could hold maybe five or six people held 
many more people, including pets, in one case a German Shepherd dog. 
Storm shelters are only successful if people use them.  Properly designed shelters can 
stand up to the winds of an EF4 or EF5 tornado or withstand debris impact is irrelevant if few 
people are in those shelters when the time comes.  These shelters were well used and there were 
a large number of them to be shared by neighbors.  The informal neighborhood networks that 
were in place allowed neighbors to know the locations of these shelters with the awareness of 
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open invitations to use them.  This provided many people with a safe place during the tornado 
and allowed these shelters to do their jobs well.  In one case, the homeowners were out of town 
and they called their neighbors to tell them that the gates were unlocked and they could get into 
the shelter.  This shelter ended up protecting over ten people, including multiple children, plus a 
dog from the surrounding homes.  Figures 4.14 and 4.15 illustrate the interior walls of this 
particular shelter.  Over the years, the homeowner has allowed the neighborhood children to 
decorate the interior walls of the shelter with their handprints and drawings with the hope that 
they won’t fear the shelter when they need it.  In the Moore tornado, the sharing of this shelter 
kept many people safe, including many of those children. 
 
Figure 4.14,  Storm shelter with walls decorated by children taking refuge. 
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Figure 4.15, Message on interior of storm shelter indicating the informal network of storm 
shelter shared use. 
4.4 Storm Shelter Analysis Conclusions 
Over 3000 registered residential shelters exist in the city of Moore.  These shelters kept 
many people safe on May 20th, 2013.  The large number of residential shelters can likely be 
attributed to the recent history of violent tornadoes in Moore.  There were few instances of above 
ground safe rooms or storm shelters, with the majority of storm shelters classified as below 
ground.  Below ground shelters performed well, although issues with access, debris blocking 
exits, and water intrusion from rain and severed water lines should be considered.  The majority 
of above ground safe rooms and storm shelters performed well and had no cases of perforation 
by windborne debris except for one ICF safe room.  Overall, this type of perforation is not 
acceptable for safe room and can likely be attributed to poor construction quality associated with 
improper concrete consolidation, especially in the thinned areas where plastic cross ties were 
located.  This was evident by the large voids on the exposed portions of the ICF walls.  In 
addition, the location of the safe room was less than ideal within the building envelope.  Having 
a wall of a safe room coincident with an exterior wall of the home increases the risk of missile 
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impact and possible penetration and/or perforation.  This exterior wall was also on the western 
face of the house which is a vulnerable region for tornadic winds.   
Another facet of the residential shelter investigation was the concept of shared shelters.  
In many cases, people knew the location of residential shelters in their neighborhood and would 
take refuge at these locations in the event they did not have a safe place to go.  Often, residential 
shelters were left unlocked so that neighbors could use the shelter in the event the home owner 
was not home.  There were several instances where these shelters were filled in excess of their 
capacity holding up to 10 adults and pets.   
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Chapter 5 - In-depth Studies and Observations 
5.1 Roof Failures Leading to Wall Collapse 
Surviving an EF2 or greater tornado from within a wood-frame house requires protection 
from the debris-filled winds that can exceed 100 mph.  While the level of protection is not up to 
the standards of a properly designed and constructed tornado shelter, survivability inside a wood-
frame house is certainly enhanced by the presence of standing walls.  Inspection of wood-frame 
houses damaged during the Moore tornado led to the conclusion that once a house’s roof is 
removed, wall collapse is imminent. 
Wind speeds at the center of a tornado path are greater than along the fringes.  Observing 
the progression of damage from the edge of the tornado path inward can provide clues regarding 
likely collapse mechanisms.  For example, damage to roofs of houses along the fringe of the 
tornado path consisted mainly of missing sheathing; roof framing (trusses or rafters) was still 
intact.  Houses adjacent but closer to the center of the tornado path were missing roofs and had 
collapsed walls.  One obvious conclusion is that the roof framing provided lateral support to the 
tops of the walls.  Once the roof was removed, the walls collapsed soon after. 
This in-depth study describes four likely roof failure mechanisms and their effect on 
lateral support to walls.  The failure mechanisms are proposed based on observed damage to 
wood-frame houses from the Moore tornado. 
1. Failure of light-gage metal garage doors, particularly on garages that extend out from the 
house, led to pressurization of the garage, subsequent loss of roof over the garage, and 
collapse of the garage walls. 
2. Prefabricated wooden roof trusses resisted uplift better than rafter/ridge-beam roofs. 
3. Removal of roofs supported by prefabricated roof trusses left the tops of walls with little 
lateral support.  On the other hand, removal of rafter/ridge-beam roofs typically left the 
separate ceiling joists in place; and thus the tops of the walls were still laterally 
supported. 
4. “High profile” roofs had relatively long unsupported spans (compared to other roof types) 
leaving them more vulnerable to uplift.  Fewer intermediate supports led to larger 
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bending moments and shear forces in the rafters; and longer distances between lateral 
support to the rafter bottom edge (compression edge for uplift) decreased resistance to 
lateral-torsional buckling of the rafters. 
The following sections describe in words and photos the observed damage supporting 
each of the four postulated failure mechanisms described above. 
1. Loss of light-gage garage doors.  
Some houses on the fringe of the 2013 Moore OK tornado path had partially collapsed 
garage doors as shown in Figure 5.1 below.  Though slight in terms of property damage, the 
consequences of losing the garage door were frequently severe. 
 
Figure 5.1, Partially collapsed light-gage metal garage door of house on tornado damage fringe. 
Loss of the garage door ruptures the building envelope and allows the inside of the 
garage to be pressurized by tornado winds.  Garages that protruded from the main footprint of 
the house seemed to be especially vulnerable.  The combination of positive pressure inside the 
garage and negative pressure outside the garage roof likely caused the garage roof to be pulled 
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up and off.  This resulted in essentially complete loss of lateral support to the tops of the garage 
walls on either side of the large garage door as shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3.  The short 
walls adjacent to the garage door opening were typically not sheathed (e.g. with plywood) and 
therefore had minimal shear stiffness. 
 
Figure 5.2,  Garage removed from house on left with protruding garage. 
 53 
 
 
Figure 5.3,  Missing garage on house with “protruding” garage. 
The garage walls in the houses shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 had properly anchored sill 
plates (see Figure 5.4 for example).  The anchored sills are effective in resisting uplift, but not 
torsion (caused by collapsing wall) and uplift. 
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Figure 5.4,  Failed sill plate with anchor bolt still attached. 
2. Prefabricated wooden trusses.   
Prefabricated roof trusses resisted uplift better than rafter/ridge beam construction.  See 
Figure 5.5 for a house with rafter/ridge beam roof framing flanking a house with prefabricated 
wood roof trusses.  The prefabricated roof trusses are still intact, but the entire roofs of the 
rafter/ridge beam roofs have been removed.  The better performance of the prefabricated roof 
trusses is likely due to the better connections (metal truss-plates loaded in shear), and the more 
web members connecting the top chord to the bottom chord. 
3. Removal of rafter/ridge-beam roofs frequently left ceiling joists in place.   
Note in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 that although the roofs, ridge beams and rafters are missing, 
the ceiling joists are still intact.  These ceiling joists provide lateral support to the walls.  Houses 
missing prefabricated truss roofs (not shown here) did not have ceiling joists, since the bottom 
chords of the roof trusses serve as the ceiling joists.  This implies that although the prefabricated 
roof trusses performed better than ridge beam/rafter roofs at one wind speed, at higher wind 
speeds the situation may be reversed. 
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Figure 5.5,  Missing rafter/ridge beam roof on house to left of house with largely intact prefab 
truss roof. 
 
Figure 5.6,  Missing roof but intact ceiling joists. 
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4. High-profile roofs had rafters with long unsupported spans for uplift 
High-profile roofs have a distinctive architectural look but may lack utility.  Another 
weakness of rafter/ridge beam roofs observed and shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 is the relatively 
long unsupported spans of the rafters (see Figure 5.7).  The rafter has minimal vertical support to 
resist gravity loads and also the support to resist uplift loads depends on a weak connection 
between the rafter and the vertical support.  In addition, while ample lateral support is provided 
to the compression side (top) of the rafter for gravity loads from the sheathing, only one point of 
lateral support is provided to the compression side (bottom) of the rafter for uplift loads from the 
purlin.  Figure 5.8 shows a house with intact garage doors but completely missing its high-profile 
roof.    
 
Figure 5.7,  Long unsupported spans of rafters on typical “high profile” roof.  Lateral support to 
bottom of rafters indicated by red arrow. 
purlin 
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Figure 5.8,  Progression of roof damage to “high profile” ridge beam/rafter roofs. 
5.2 Truss Connections in Single Family Dwellings (EF2 wind speed 110 - 137 mph) 
Two homes located diagonally across the street from one another on one of the narrowest 
sections of the tornado path (i.e. visible damage width was ~200 yd) were compared for 
performance of the roof trusses.  The home at 808 S. Silver Leaf Drive was located 
approximately 180 ft south of the center of the damage path on the east side of the north-south 
street and the home at 805 S. Silver Leaf Drive was located approximately 150 ft south of the 
center of the damage path on the west side of the street.  The homes directly to the south of both 
808 and 805 S. Silver Leaf sustained substantially less damage, while the homes directly to the 
north of both were nearly completely destroyed.  Locations of the homes in both before and after 
aerial views are shown in Figure 5.9.  
Both homes were single story, wood frame structures with brick veneer, an attached 
garage, and a fireplace.  Both homes had gable roofs consisting of 2 × 4 trusses spaced at 24 in. 
connected with press plates and attached to the 2 × 4 wall plates with two 16d toe-nails at each 
truss, 1x6 roof sheathing, and asphalt shingle roofing.  The roof of 808 S. Silver Leaf had a pitch 
of 5.5:12 and the truss height was 74 in.  The roof of 805 S. Silver leaf had a pitch of 5:12 and 
the truss height was 97 in.  The 2 × 4 stud walls were connected to the foundation slab using ½ 
in. anchor bolts for both homes.  Walls were sheathed with insulating fiberboard sheathing at all 
locations except for the corners of the homes, which each had one sheet of plywood sheathing in 
each direction. 
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Figure 5.9, Before (left) (Google Maps 2013) and after (right) (Google Crisis Response, 2013) 
photos showing home locations. 
808 S. Silver Leaf Drive 
This single family home was built in 1978 and was a 1306 ft2, 3 bedroom, 2 bath home 
according to zillow.com (Zillow, 2013).  Before and after views of the home are shown in Figure 
5.10.  Damage to the home consisted of: 
• The northern, approximately 50% of roof structure missing 
• Approximately 30% of the roofing material was missing from the remaining structure 
• Garage and living room exterior walls on north and west sides destroyed 
• Remaining back wall (east) slanted outward and front wall (west) slanted inward  
• Chimney toppled 
• Remaining westward windows broken, likely by flying debris 
805 S. Silver Leaf 
808 S. Silver Leaf 
North 
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Figure 5.10, 808 S. Silver Leaf Drive (a) before (Google Maps, 2013) and (b) after the tornado. 
The Degree of Damage (DOD) on the EF scale was 6 based on the removed roof structure and 
most walls remaining intact, which suggests wind speeds between 104 and 142 mph with an 
expected speed of 122 mph.  The collapsed walls indicated a DOD nearer to 7 and wind speeds 
toward the high end of this range.   
All walls that were completely destroyed were connected to the garage or garage walls.  
Anchor bolts provided for the wall bottom plate to slab foundation connection had no evidence 
of nuts or washers in most of the exposed locations.  Brick ties were provided on all walls, but 
structural sheathing was only provided at the corners of the home, probably as intermittent 
bracing as allowed by the building code.  The roof truss geometry is shown in Figures 5.11 and 
5.12.  The truss connector plates used for the roof trusses were approximately 1/16 in. thick, 
made of steel with unknown properties, and were provided on both sides of the truss at each 
connection.  The pressed in connector plates were very small or poorly aligned at many 
connections and many of the smallest connection plates (1 in. by 4 in. connecting intermediate 
bracing) failed as shown in Figures 5.11 through 5.14.  These smallest plates were oriented in the 
direction of the intermediate braces and were theoretically in pure tension or compression.  Each 
(a) 
(b) 
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had approximately 32, 3/16 in. points pressed into the wood, distributed across the two members 
being connected.  The failures of these smallest plates in the trusses that remained intact were on 
the east side, as shown in Figure 5.13, whereas those on the west side did not fail.  The 
connection to the wall top plate was intact on the east side, but not on the west side due to the 
severe lean of the wall shown in Figure 5.12.  Only connectors on two of the intact trusses were 
broken, but other failures of the 1 in. by 4 in. connector plates were observed in the portions of 
the roof structure piled in the yard on the east side of the home. 
 
Figure 5.11, Geometry of roof trusses at 808 S. Silver Leaf. 
 
Figure 5.12, Intact roof truss with plate failure location indicated. 
 61 
 
 
Figure 5.13, Examples of (a) small truss connector plate failures at location indicated and (b) 
small connector plates that remained intact. 
 
Figure 5.14, Example of connector with unequal overlap of the connector similarly observed in 
several locations. The gap between the wood members was within the range allowed at the time. 
  
(a) (b) 
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805 S. Silver Leaf Drive. 
This single family home was built in 1975 and was a 1366 ft2, 3 bedroom 2 bath home 
according to zillow.com (Zillow, 2013).  Before and after views of the home are shown in Figure 
5.15.  Damage to the home consisted of: 
• Approximately 40% of roof structure destroyed on south end 
• Approximately 20% of roofing material missing from remaining structure 
• Roof was shifted east off of the walls in the areas where it remained intact 
• Gable end siding removed from remaining structure (north end) 
• Garage walls leaning outward (east and north)  
• Chimney broken at roof level 
• Most windows broken on south and east sides, likely from flying debris 
All walls remained intact as seen in Figure 5.16, but the building only had plywood 
structural sheathing at each corner, probably for intermittent bracing as allowed by the building 
code.  The roof truss pattern and field measured dimensions are shown in Figure 5.17.  The truss 
connector plates had the same thickness, but were more robust in their dimensions and of a 
different type than those in 808 S. Silver Leaf, as shown in Figure 5.18.  The properties of the 
steel were also not known.  The truss members were the same size (2×4) as those in the roof 
structure of 808 S. Silver Leaf.   
The smallest truss plate connectors were 2 in. by 4 in. instead of the 1 in. by 4 in. 
connectors observed in 808 S. Silver Leaf and the largest connectors were 5 in. by 8 in. instead 
of the 3 in. by 6 in. plates observed in 808 S. Silver Leaf.  No evidence of connection plate 
failures was observed in 808 S. Silver Leaf, with all failures located within the truss members 
similarly to the piece shown in Figure 5.18(b).  
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Figure 5.15, 805 S. Silver Leaf Drive (a) before (Google Maps, 2013) and (b) after the tornado. 
The Degree of Damage (DOD) on the EF scale was 6 based on the removed roof structure and 
most walls remaining intact, which suggests wind speeds between 104 and 142 mph with an 
expected speed of 122 mph. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
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Figure 5.16, 808 S. Silver Leaf Drive after the tornado. 
 
Figure 5.17, North end and truss arrangement for 805 S. Silver Leaf Drive. 
 
Figure 5.18, (a) Larger truss connector plates than for 808 S. Silver Leaf and (b) example of 
failure within the truss members. 
(a) (b) 
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The directional location of the major damage and portion of the home affected was 
different for these two homes.  The loss of structure for 808 S. Silver Leaf began with the 
westward facing garage whereas the damage to 805 S. Silver Leaf began with the southern gable 
end.  In both cases, evidence was observed of the lost trusses being pulled from the toe-nail 
connections on the remaining walls.  Uplift of the 1 × 6 roof sheathing and flying debris may 
have contributed to the failure of members within trusses that remained connected to the walls 
for 805 S. Silver Leaf, by producing loadings other than tension and compression and exceeding 
the capacity of the 2 × 4 sections.  The connector plate failures in 808 S. Silver Leaf were likely 
caused by tension in the bracing members resulting from outward pressure on the east side roof 
not considered in design.  The 24 in. truss spacing produced a substantial tributary area for each 
of the previously mentioned loadings and subsequent failures.  Both the truss to wall connection 
and connections within the trusses were important factors in the behavior of these homes. 
5.3 House Shifting from Foundation  
The objective of this in-depth study is to report on the absence of homes that had shifted 
from their foundation in the 2013 Moore tornado compared to those found on similar assessment 
trips prior to this tornado in Joplin and Tuscaloosa in 2011 and Moore in 1999. 
Damage assessment surveys conducted after previous tornadoes in Tuscaloosa, Joplin, 
and Moore showed a few cases where houses had shifted from their foundations, but remained 
intact as seen in 5.19 and Figure 5.20.  This particular failure mode was not observed in Moore 
on this damage assessment survey.  This is unusual because Marshall (2002) observed houses 
surveyed after the 1999 Moore tornado that failed in a similar manner as seen in Figure 5.21. 
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Figure 5.19, House shifted off of foundation in Joplin, MO after 2011 Tornado. 
 
Figure 5.20, House shifted off of crawlspace foundation in Tuscaloosa, AL after 2011 Tornado. 
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FEMA (1999) stated that residential structures built in Moore were required to meet 
design requirements listed in the one and two-family dwelling building code published by the 
Council of American Building Officials (CABO).  However, houses built prior to 1995 were 
governed by a less restrictive building code.  
The CABO (1995) building code requires that walls be anchored to concrete foundations 
by 1.3 cm (0.5 in) diameter steel anchor bolts spaced a maximum of 1.8 m (6 ft) apart.  
According to this code, anchor bolts also should extend a minimum of 18 cm (7 in.) into the 
concrete. 
Most houses observed by Marshall (2002) were fastened to foundations by 5 cm (2 in) 
long, tapered cut nails driven through the top sides of the sill plates at intervals of 30 to 130 cm 
(12–51 in).  The sill plates at 3.8 cm x 8.9 cm (1.5 in × 3.5 in) allowed the tapered cut nails to 
extend a maximum of 1.3 cm (0.5 in) into the concrete foundation.  As seen in Figure 5.22 scrape 
marks found on concrete slabs that extended from the points where tapered cut nails had been 
installed indicated that the walls moved laterally in the tornado.  These connections, although 
Figure 5.21, House shifted off foundation 90 m in Moore, OK after 1999 tornado (Marshall, 
2002). 
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able to keep the walls in place under normal gravity loads, are not adequate when wind forces are 
applied. 
 
Figure 5.22, Scrape mark in the surface of concrete slab foundation indicating where the wall 
bottom plate along with the tapered cut nail connection were moved laterally (Marshall, 2002). 
The uplift pressure of wind can exceed the weight of an average residential structure at 
around 125 – 135 mph in straight-line winds (Prevatt, 2012).  Once the uplift pressure reaches 
the weight of the building, the lateral wind pressure is able to push the house off of the 
foundation.  Sufficiently embedded anchor bolts provide resistance to this uplift pressure and 
sliding failure. 
The absence of observed houses sliding off of foundations in Moore can most likely be 
attributed to the requirement of anchor bolts securing the foundation in recent construction.  
Many anchor bolts were found without nuts and washers, which would keep them from resisting 
uplift force, but the bolts themselves were able to resist lateral loads trying to push a house off 
the foundation. 
5.4 Progressive Failure of Residential Garages 
Within the context of this report, a superstructure failure is any failure of the framing 
system in a residential building.  This includes failure of the roof, rafters, joists, load bearing 
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walls and non-load bearing walls.  According to the majority of data gathered in this 
investigation, framing failure in a wood-frame residential structure appears to follow an ordered 
and predictable mechanism in the presence of tornado forces.  This sequence is illustrated in five 
basic stages in Figure 5.23 through Figure 5.27.  In this study, observations made immediately 
after the storm clearly demonstrate that failure of single-family homes begins in the garage.  The 
most likely explanation for this observation is that the metal paneling construction of the 
overhead door represents the weak link in the building shell.  In order to resist severe wind 
pressure effects, it is critical that the building shell not be punctured.  However, the lightweight 
garage door typically has significantly lower lateral strength than the surrounding walls.  In 
addition, garage doors in Oklahoma are not typically wind rated.  For instance, while the design 
wind speed is 115 mph according to ASCE 7-10, most doors are not designed to meet this 
minimum.  As a result, the door is the first element to give way under abnormally high wind 
loading, as shown in Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24.   
 
Figure 5.23, Stage 1 -- Wind Pressure Initiates Failure of the Garage Door  
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Figure 5.24, Stage 2 -- Garage Door Completely Destroyed 
As soon as the garage door has been breached, the shell of the building is no longer intact 
and immediately begins to function as a “partially enclosed” structure, rather than an “enclosed” 
one.  When the home begins to behave as a partially enclosed structure, ASCE 7-10 dictates that 
the internal pressure coefficient is boosted from GCpi = + 0.18 to GCpi = + 0.55.  The typical 
result of this transition to a partially enclosed structure is that the internal wall pressure and uplift 
within the garage moves to a range far beyond what the wood-frame walls and roof trusses can 
resist and literally attempts to blow the structure up like a balloon.  This also serves to explain 
why garages that have failed in this manner (such as shown in Figure 5.25 and 5.26) often give 
the appearance of having “blown up”, rather than simply collapsing.  Once the garage has been 
completely destroyed, the front of the home is left exposed (see Figure 5.27), and the damage 
progresses into the structure in a similar manner.  
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Figure 5.25, Stage 3 -- Home Becomes Partially Enclosed Structure; Roof Begins Peeling Off 
 
Figure 5.26, Stage 4 -- Garage Wall Framing Starts to Fail 
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Figure 5.27, Stage 5 -- Garage Completely Destroyed; Main Roof Begins Peeling Off; Attic is 
now partially Enclosed 
At this point, with the garage completely destroyed, the main portion of the house 
becomes vulnerable due to increased exposure.  This exposure leads to wind loading in two 
different manners: wind pressure on the windward side of the roof slope and wind suction on the 
leeward side of the roof slope.  This combination of pressure and suction has the potential to 
rapidly deteriorate the roof truss structure via connection failure.  In a typical wood-frame 
residential structure, the roof framing have connections as shown in Figure 5.28, with kickers 
directly bracing the roof rafter.  Or they have connections as shown in Figure 5.29, with the 
kickers supporting a roof purlin that then acts as a brace point for the roof rafter. 
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Figure 5.28, Typical Roof Truss Connections 
Kicker 
Rafter 
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Figure 5.29, Typical Roof Truss Connections 
In general, these nailed connections are intended to perform well in compression, but 
tend to be highly vulnerable to tension forces.  Tension is induced when the leeward slope of the 
roof is subjected to uplift.  The resulting failure mechanism is illustrated in Figure 5.30. 
Purlin 
Kicker 
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Figure 5.30, Roof Truss Failure Mechanism 
In the event of a failure as illustrated in Figure 5.30, the following sequence occurs: 
1. Due to connection failure, the rafter loses a brace point, effectively becoming twice as 
long. 
2. Doubling the rafter length stresses the rafter beyond design capacity. 
3. The rafter fails in flexure, causing a general failure in the roof system on the leeward 
slope. 
5.5 In-depth Studies Conclusions 
The in-depth studies performed in the aftermath of the Moore tornado lead to the 
following conclusions.  
• Failure of garage doors causes the shell of a building to function as a “partially enclosed” 
structure, rather than an “enclosed” structure.  The typical result of this transition is that the 
internal pressure and uplift within the garage moves to a range far beyond what the wood-
frame walls and roof trusses can resist.  This leads to pressurization of the garage, subsequent 
loss of roof over the garage, and collapse of the garage walls.   
Wind pressure 
Into the roof 
Wind suction 
Away from the roof 
Failure Mechanism:  
Loss of connection at Pt. 1 or Pt. 2 due to wind suction uplift 
2 
1 
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• Prefabricated wooden roof trusses were observed to resist uplift better than rafter/ridge-beam 
roofs.  But removal of roofs supported by prefabricated roof trusses left the tops of walls with 
little lateral support.  Removal of rafter/ridge-beam roofs typically left the separate ceiling 
joists in place; and thus the tops of the walls were still laterally supported.  Truss to wall 
connection and connections within the trusses were important factors in the behavior of these 
homes. 
• “High profile” roofs had relatively long unsupported spans (compared to other roof types) 
leaving them more vulnerable to uplift.   
• The absence of observed houses sliding off of foundations in Moore can most likely be 
attributed to the requirement of anchor bolts securing the structure to the foundation. 
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Chapter 6 - Aerial Assessment of Damage  
The methodology for this investigation consisted of assessing the May 20th, 2013 tornado 
damage using aerial images available through Google Earth.  This software is equipped with a 
time history tool that allows the user to view a specific area at an arbitrary point in time (if 
images were captured at or close to that date).  Using this time history tool, a user may view 
pictures of Moore that were captured on May 21, 2013, one day after the devastating tornado 
struck.  This provides a complete aerial view of the tornado path from start to finish.  Having 
access to the aerial image of the tornado path affords a unique opportunity to study the results of 
the storm, since it makes it possible to analyze patterns and behaviors that are not visible from 
ground level. 
These tools may be utilized in many different ways in order to analyze the behavior of the 
May 20th tornado.  In this section, aerial images will be used to evaluate the tornado on the basis 
of residential damage intensity.  This assessment will span the entire length of the tornado path, 
from Newcastle to eastern Moore, and will include not only identifying buildings that suffered 
top-of-the-scale damage (EF4 – EF5), but also identifying buildings very nearby that were 
significantly less damaged.  In order to carry out this evaluation, the path of the tornado was 
broken down a total of 5 distinct residential areas that were impacted.  The path of the tornado 
and various residential areas influenced by the storm are indicated by labels in Figure 6.1.  Note 
that these residential areas are arbitrary and approximate, but serve to give a general sense of the 
areas impacted by the storm.   
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Figure 6.1, Neighborhoods and Labels. 
6.1 Damage Intensity along Tornado Path 
The purpose of this section is to examine the path of the May 20th tornado in order to 
identify areas where heavy damage occurred.  The first inspected area of damage to residential 
structures caused by this tornado was observed in a small subdivision on NW 36th St. labeled 
Neighborhood #1 in Figure 6.1.  Figure 6.2 shows a pre-event aerial view of this subdivision. 
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Figure 6.2, Location of first inspected neighborhood (Newcastle, OK). 
The damage sustained by this neighborhood is shown in Figure 6.3.  Although extreme, 
the tornado did not completely destroy the homes and left many walls still standing.  It is 
interesting to note that the most severely damaged home in the neighborhood (completely 
leveled) is located very close to a home that was almost undamaged.  This observation is 
illustrated in greater detail in Figure 6.4. 
N
. C
ou
nt
ry
 C
lu
b 
R
d.
 
NW 36th St. 
North 
 80 
 
 
Figure 6.3, Damage in Newcastle neighborhood (NW 36th). 
 
Figure 6.4, Damage Separation in Newcastle neighborhood (NW 36th). 
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The next residential area impacted by the tornado was located further to the northeast 
after the storm crossed the H.E. Bailey Turnpike (I-44).  This neighborhood, labeled 
Neighborhood #2 in Figure 6.1, is located approximately 2.5 miles to the west of Moore.  The 
pre-event view of this neighborhood is shown in Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5, Neighborhood #2 Undamaged Condition (Sparse Residential Area Near Moore, 
Oklahoma). 
An aerial assessment of Neighborhood #2 indicates that the damage intensity was low 
compared to areas to the west.  A visual inspection of the post-event aerial image indicates that 
no homes in this neighborhood were completely leveled.  The damage was not extreme, as seen 
in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, in this neighborhood.  The only home completely destroyed in this 
neighborhood was a single-wide mobile home, seen in the upper right-hand corner of Figure 6.6.   
SW 157th St. 
SW 160th St. 
S 
St
 C
la
ire
 
 
North 
 82 
 
 
Figure 6.6, Neighborhood #2 – Damage 1 
 
Figure 6.7, Neighborhood #2 – Damage 2 
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Up to this point, the tornado path can only be tracked by the presence of damage and 
debris spreading.  Shortly after crossing the neighborhood at SW 157th and S St Claire, however, 
the tornado reached a level of strength high enough to leave a trail of bare soil.  This transition is 
illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8, Beginning of Soil Trail 
This simple observation also appears to mark a turning point in the severity of damage 
inflicted by the tornado.  From the point that visual inspection from an aerial perspective 
indicates a bare soil trail, residential structures directly in the tornado’s path appear to sustain 
more extreme levels of damage.  This is readily illustrated by the damage to the residential area 
seen in Figure 6.9.   
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Figure 6.9, Neighborhood #3 Location and Undamaged Condition 
The damage across the width of this neighborhood, which is labeled Neighborhood #3 in 
Figure 6.1, is shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11.  Notice that at this point in the tornado path, 
the damage is very severe for most homes.  Figures 6.12 and 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17, 
6.18 and 6.19, and 6.20 and 6.21 show the images before and after the tornado for Neighborhood 
#4, #5, #6, #7, and #8 shown in Figure 6.1, respectively.    
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Figure 6.10, Neighborhood #3 – Damage 1 
 
Figure 6.11, Neighborhood #3 – Damage 2 
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Figure 6.12, Neighborhood #4 Location and Undamaged Condition. 
 
Figure 6.13, Neighborhood #4 Damage 
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Figure 6.14, Neighborhood #5 Location and Undamaged Condition 
 
Figure 6.15, Neighborhood #5 – Damage overview 
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Figure 6.16, Neighborhood #6 Location and Undamaged Condition 
 
Figure 6.17, Neighborhood #6 Damage  
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Figure 6.18, Neighborhood #7 Location and Undamaged Condition 
 
Figure 6.19, Neighborhood #7 Damage 
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Figure 6.20, Neighborhood #8 Location and Undamaged Condition 
 
Figure 6.21, Neighborhood #8 Damage 
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6.2 Debris Flow Patterns Assessment Methodology 
The same assessment methodology used in the aerial assessment of damage was 
employed to find the debris flow patterns.  This methodology consisted of studying aerial 
imagery taken from Google Earth on May 21, 2013.  This aerial assessment uses physical 
evidence left by the storm to investigate two specific topics related to debris patterns.  First, the 
debris flow (the patterns and scattering of debris left by the tornado) and second is debris 
transport (the ability of a tornado to carry both light and heavy debris tremendous distances).   
6.3 Observed Debris Flow Patterns 
Debris flow refers to the pattern and final resting positions of debris after the event.  The 
objective of this investigation was to study debris flow patterns in order to better understand 
wind behavior associated with a tornado and the relationship between wind direction and the 
direction of the tornado path.  As Figures 6.22 through 6.25 indicate, the most common mode of 
debris flow in the May 20th tornado was very straightforward and highly consistent.  In almost all 
cases where discernible debris flow was observed, the flow took the form of a “streaking” effect 
in the direction of the tornado path.  In other words, trails of debris were laid out in thin lines 
from the debris source, pointing in the direction of the tornado travel.  This pattern is seen 
consistently throughout this section.  The only case where such behavior is not observed is in 
densely populated neighborhoods where there are too many debris piles to distinguish any streak 
lines.  Each case of debris flow in this section is documented with two images.  The upper image 
in each figure shows the pre-event undamaged condition, while the lower image of each figure 
shows the pattern of debris spreading (with arrows to indicate direction of flow).  Debris trails, or 
streaking, are more evident in locations were the topography of the ground slopes downhill in the 
same direction as the tornado path (i.e. the elevation drops in the direction of the tornado path).   
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Figure 6.22, Debris Flow 1 -- Approximately Parallel to Tornado Path 
  
North 
N
. 
Xebec Way / 35th St. 
Xebec Way / 35th St. 
 93 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.23, Debris Flow 2 -- Spreading in direction of tornado travel 
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Figure 6.24, Debris Flow 3 -- "Streak Lines" 
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Figure 6.25, Debris Flow 4 – Debris Lines from Highland East 
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6.4 Old US 62 Steel Truss Bridge Debris Transport 
When the tornado passed through this location, it generated sufficient force to destroy 
two spans of the bridge, knocking them off their piers and shredding the truss structure, as seen 
by comparing the pre-event photo, Figure 6.26(a), with the post-event photo, Figure 6.26(b). 
 
Figure 6.26, Old US 62 Steel Truss Bridge near I-44, (a) pre-event photo, (b) post-event photo. 
The damage shown in Figure 6.26(b) indicates the strength of the tornado in terms of its 
ability to transport heavy debris.  In this case, the power of the tornado is demonstrated by its 
ability to lift a bridge off of its piers and turn it upside down. 
  
(a) (b) 
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6.5 Oilfield Tank Farm Debris Transport 
Among the many components of infrastructure destroyed by the May 20th tornado, 
several oilfield pumping and/or storage sites equipped with multiple storage tanks were hit.  This 
generated identifiable debris that was scattered across the city of Moore.  The largest tank farm 
(believed to be the source of this debris) is shown before and after the storm in Figure 6.27 and 
6.28 respectively.  This facility is located a few miles west of Moore on SW 149th.   
After the tornado event, the facility was left in the condition shown in Figure 6.28.  Six of 
the ten original tanks at the facility were carried away by the storm, and the tanks still on site 
were displaced and severely damaged.  After the tornado struck this site, several of the tanks 
were torn loose and transported to various locations to the northeast along the path of the storm.  
The post-storm investigation identified several of these tanks in the city of Moore: one had been 
dropped on the roof of Briarwood elementary school and another landed in the yard north of 
Briarwood elementary school as shown in Figure 6.29.  These resting places indicate a carried 
distance of roughly 4,400 feet.  Resting places of this debris is shown in Figures 6.30 and 6.31. 
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Figure 6.27, Tank Farm Undamaged Condition. 
 
Figure 6.28, Damaged Tank Farm 
SW 149th St 
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Figure 6.29, Tank Debris Transport 
 
 
Figure 6.30, Oilfield Tank on Briarwood Elementary School Roof 
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Figure 6.31, Oilfield Tank on Briarwood Lawn 
6.5 Aerial Damage Assessment Conclusions 
This study generated several important conclusions based on an aerial investigation.  First 
and foremost, the study demonstrated the tremendous benefit of having access to a 
comprehensive aerial overview of a tornado-impacted area.  In addition to being crucial for 
search and rescue efforts in the first 24 hours after a destructive storm, access to aerial imagery is 
also useful for a comprehensive damage assessment.  While certain failure mechanisms and 
damage patterns are best determined from ground-level, there are many patterns and behaviors 
that may be detected far more easily and accurately from the air.  These patterns include overall 
direction of the tornado path, width of the damage path, flow and spreading of debris, long-
distance transport of debris, and general distribution of damage intensity.   
Of the behaviors and patterns listed above, the two behaviors of interest in this study 
were flow/spreading of debris and long-distance transport of debris.  The first (and most 
obvious) finding of this report is that debris flow patterns are far easier to distinguish in 
relatively open areas.  When damage occurs in a densely populated neighborhood, any pattern in 
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spreading of debris is difficult (if not impossible) to discern.  The second finding is that, in 
general, debris most commonly flows in the direction of the tornado path.  This flow is typically 
manifested by a series of “streak lines” where debris from a demolished structure spreads out in 
thin lines that point away from the source and towards the tornado travel direction.  In the case of 
a small group of homes being destroyed, these thin lines of debris may even converge with one 
another as the tornado moves onto open ground.  In this study, no cases were identified in which 
any well-defined pattern of debris flow occurred opposite to the direction of tornado travel.   
An evaluation of debris transport patterns indicated that most heavy structural debris 
tends to be carried in the forward direction (parallel to tornado travel).  This was evidenced by 
both the Old US 62 Bridge deck components and by the scattering of oilfield tanks across the 
city.   
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Chapter 7- Failure Progression, Fragility, and Laboratory 
Correlations 
7.1 Failure Progression and Building Fragility within a Tornado Wind Field 
Data collected from recent tornadoes in Tuscaloosa, Joplin, and Moore show a consistent 
pattern of damage to residential structures.  For an EF4 or EF5 tornado, damage levels increase 
from the outer edges towards the center line of a tornado track.  From the damage data collected, 
this study tries to explain the residential structure failure progression within a tornado wind field 
to get a better understanding of the correlation between tornado wind speed and structural 
damage.  In general, the progression of residential structure failure often depends on wind speed, 
wind direction, windborne debris impact, and the capacity of building components. 
7.1.1 Damage Pattern in a Tornado Path  
General observation: 
Residential building damage in tornados is caused by high wind loading or debris impact 
or both.  Failure of residential buildings in tornado winds is often due to: 
• Lack of continuous sheathing, fiberboard sheathing, lack of gable end sheathing, 
garages without anchor bolts. 
• Lack of garage wall sheathing, a limited use of plywood with most of the sheathing 
fiberglass or hardboard siding. 
• Observation from recent tornadoes (Tuscaloosa, AL, April 27, 2011 (van de Lindt et 
al, 2013); Joplin, MO, May 22, 2011 (Prevatt et al, 2012); and Moore, OK, May 20, 
2013 shows that structures often did not have continuous load path from the 
foundation to the roof. 
When a house was hit by windborne debris, the internal pressure changed causing 
progressive damage of the structure.  The failure progression depends on where the debris 
impacts occurred; the relative location of the house to the tornado track; and the orientation of 
the house with respect to the tornado path. 
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Damage pattern in tornado wind field: 
In order to document the damage due to tornadic wind, the assessment team collected 
damage data in a neighborhood at the western edge of Moore as indicated by the circle on Figure 
7.1.  This fairly new neighborhood was located on Kyle Dr. and SW 151st Street and was built 
around 2006.  The buildings in this neighborhood were believed to be less affected by windborne 
debris because the tornado traveled from west to east, and west of this neighborhood the area is 
flat open fields with only a few residential houses with minimal damage.  Therefore, it was 
believed that the damage to the houses in this neighborhood primarily came from tornado wind 
loading rather than debris impact.  The houses in this area had similar structural configuration, 
which made it easier to identify the wind field from the damage patterns as compared to other 
areas. 
 104 
 
 
Figure 7.1, Neighborhood used in this discussion section. 
Figure 7.2(a) shows the damage to residential structures on SW 151st Street looking west.  
This figure shows houses on both sides of the street, and one can see that all homes on the left 
side still have garage doors and sustained little or no damage, while homes on the right side of 
the street lost garage doors that blew inward.  Since all the garage doors had similar design and 
were installed on rails inside of the door opening, the reinforcement bars are placed inside of the 
door, and these garage doors had higher capacity when experiencing negative pressure (outward 
load) as compared to lower capacity with positive pressure (inward load).  This is because with 
the outward load case the load is transferred to the wall and rails through compression, while in 
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the inward load case, the rails failed by bending into the garage.  With this reasoning, it can be 
seen from Figure 7.2(a) that the residential houses in this picture experienced mainly one wind 
direction as the tornado passed this street, and the garage doors on the left were on the leeward 
walls (negative wind pressure) while those on the right side of the street were on the windward 
walls (positive pressure).  This behavior can also be seen on streets where the direction of the 
street changes, and the garage doors change from leeward to windward as shown in Figure 
7.2(b).  This means that when the tornado passed this area, these houses only experienced 
horizontal winds (the failure pattern was similar to straight line winds seen during hurricanes).  
For those houses having garage doors on the windward side in straight wind, the garage doors 
often fail before roof sheathing panels. 
 
Figure 7.2, Different garage door damage levels (a) on both sides of SW 151st Street and (b) 
when house directions change. 
Homes on Kyle Dr., a north-south street shown in the circled area on Figure 7.1, 
indicated an increase in damage to homes that are located closer to the center line of the tornado 
Wind direction 
(a) 
(b) 
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track.  This damage pattern is similar to what was observed in the aftermath of Tuscaloosa and 
Joplin tornadoes.  Figure 7.3 shows the damage pattern of houses on the Kyle Dr. in which the 
camera was pointed to the south looking away from the centerline of the tornado.  It should be 
noted that the tornado vortex was counter-clockwise and this neighborhood was on the south side 
of the tornado center line.  Therefore, the houses on the south edge of the damage area 
experienced west-to-east winds, which is right-to-left in Figure 7.3.  In Figure 7.3, the houses on 
the right side (west) near the middle of the street had the roof fail before the garage door failed.  
Failure of the roof happened on the leeward side of the roof and the roof was intact on the 
windward side.  The garage doors, on the leeward side, were not damage on these homes.  
Similar damage was observed on the roof of the houses on the left side (east) of the street (failure 
happened on the leeward roof, intact on the windward roof), but the garage doors on the left side 
of the street all failed.  This is because roof sheathing panels are weaker in uplift and stronger in 
compression due to nail withdrawal capacity.  This failure pattern indicated that these houses 
experienced higher wind speed than at the edge of damage area and mainly in one direction of 
horizontal winds.  It can also be seen in Figure 7.3 that garage doors and roofs failed on both 
sides of Kyle Dr. to the north where the photo was taken and several walls were collapsed in the 
house on the north-east end of Kyle Dr., far left in Figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3, Damage pattern on Kyle Dr., Moore, Oklahoma (Camera pointed to the south). 
A closer inspection near the northern segment of Kyle Dr. indicated that the homes in this 
area experienced wind in one direction, as shown in Figure 7.4.  Again, the house on the left had 
roof failure and the garage door survived, while the house on the right had the garage door blown 
in and only a minimal amount of sheathing panels failed. 
Wind direction 
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Figure 7.4, Failure of roofs and garage doors on (a) west side and (b) east side of Kyle Dr. 
7.1.2 Failure Progression in Residential Structures 
To explain the different types of structural failure observed within a tornado wind field, a 
sketch of a tornado wind field is introduced in Figure 7.5.  This sketch is based on the residential 
building damage that was observed in the aftermath of several tornadoes.  In large tornados, the 
damage area along the tornado track can be divided into three bands.  In Figure 7.5, Band 1 is the 
area right outside of the tornado core, in this area, buildings often experience straight winds in 
one direction, and the damage to residential structures is similar to what was observed in 
hurricane winds: garage doors fail on the windward side and some roof sheathing fails on the 
leeward side, as seen in Figure 7.2.  In Band 1, the wind velocity has a much larger horizontal 
than vertical component.  Band 2 is where the wind field in a tornado has significant vertical 
wind and the horizontal wind is also strong.  A building in Band 2 experiences horizontal winds 
in two different directions as the tornado moves over the building.  As can be seen in Figure 7.5, 
buildings in Band 2 also experience straight line wind before transitioning into a horizontal plus 
vertical wind filed.  Therefore, buildings in Band 2 often have failure of garage doors on the 
windward side and the roof damage on both windward and leeward sides.  This failure pattern is 
because uplift occurs on both sides of a roof as seen in Figure 7.4.  Buildings in Band 3 often 
have higher damage levels not only due to higher wind speeds at the core, but also because the 
building experiences winds from all directions.  As the tornado passes over a building, horizontal 
winds will go in two opposite directions.  In addition, buildings in Band 3 also experience large 
uplift wind suction.  Damage to buildings in Band 3 is extreme and often consists of roof loss, 
exterior wall loss, interior wall loss, and even total destruction of the structure. 
Wind direction 
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Figure 7.5, Damage zone on a large tornado track. 
7.1.3 Building Component Fragility 
In order to make a quantitative assessment based on the structural failure progression 
discussed above, this section introduces some conditional fragilities based on several previous 
studies.  In general, the failure probability can be defined through the expression of the following 
limit state function: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]∑ ==<=<
y
yDPyDXGPXGP .00    (7.1) 
where D is the random variable representing the demand on the system (e.g., 3-sec gust wind 
speed) and [ ]yDP =  is the natural hazard probability, ( )[ ]yDXGP =< 0  is the conditional limit 
state probability, and denotes the so-called fragility (Ellingwood et al, 2004).  For roofing 
components, the limit state function G(R, W, D) = R – (W – D), where R is component 
resistance, W is wind load and D is dead load.  For lateral wind load bearing component such as 
shear walls or garage doors, there is no dead load component in lateral direction, therefore the 
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limit state function G(R,W) = R – W was used to calculate the fragility.  Component fragility 
functions were constructed for a typical house along Kyle Dr. in Moore, OK.  The house has a 
plan area of 35ft × 35ft and the mean roof height of 16 ft and a roof slope of 35o.  The un-
factored wind load applied on low-rise building components and cladding can be computed as: 
[ ]piph GCGCqW −=      (7.2) 
where qh is the velocity pressure evaluated at the mean roof height, G is gust factor, Cp is 
external pressure coefficient and Cpi is internal pressure coefficient.  The velocity pressure is 
calculated following ASCE-7 (2010) as: 
200256.0 VKKKq dzthh =     (7.3) 
where Kh is the exposure factor, Kzt is the topographic factor (taken equal to unity so as not to 
make the results dependent on local topography surrounding the building); and Kd is the 
directional factor (in this study, because the wind direction is determined from Figure 7.5 and 
was not considered as a random variable, Kd is set to unity); and V is wind velocity, i.e. basic 
wind speed.  The statistics of the component resistance (or capacity) is listed in Table 7.1 for 
different building components and Table 7.2 lists the statistics of the dead load and the wind load 
parameters used in this study.  For wind load in damage Band 2 and damage Band 3, the total 
pressure coefficient is scaled by a factor Kc to accounts for vertical wind velocity pressure 
increases (van de Lindt et al, 2013) based on the study by Haan et al. (2010). 
Table 7.1, Resistance statistics of building component. 
Building component 
Capacity 
Source 
Mean COV Distribution type 
Roof cover (asphalt shingle) 51 psf 0.4 Normal Cope (2004) 
Garage Door 52 psf 0.2 Normal Cope (2004) 
Roof Sheathing 69 psf 0.22 Normal van de Lindt et al. (2013) 
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Table 7.2, Load Statistics. 
Variables Statistics parameters Note 
Mean COV Distribution 
Dead Load D 3.5 psf (168 N/m2) 0.10 Normal Lee and Rosowsky, 2005 
Kh 1 0.14 Normal Lee and Rosowsky, 2005 
GCp (C&C) 
     Roof Zone 1 
     Roof Zone 2 
     Roof Zone 3 
     Wall Zone 4 
 
0.855 
1.615 
2.470 
0.900 
 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
Normal 
Normal 
Normal 
Normal 
Normal 
 
Based on ASCE 7-10 and 
Ellingwood et al (2004). 
GCpi 
Enclosed 
Partially enclosed: 
 
0.15 
0.46 
 
0.33 
0.33 
 
Normal 
Normal 
 
Lee and Rosowsky, 2005 
Figure 7.6 presents fragility functions for different components of a building in damage 
Band 1, shown in Figure 7.5.  The fragility functions of these building components were 
calculated with the condition that the building had no windward window broken or garage door 
failure (the internal pressure does not change and the building remains partially enclosed).  It was 
also assume that in damage Band 1, the vertical component of wind velocity was small and the 
wind load applied on the building components is similar to straight wind.  The wind load was 
calculated based on Equation (7.2).  From the fragility functions shown in Figure 7.6, it can be 
seen that roof cover (asphalt shingles) often fail first.  If one looks at the median value, 50% roof 
cover loss in roof zone 3 (corner, defined by ASCE7 for C&C) occurs around EF1 wind speed 
and 50% roof cover loss in roof zone 2 (roof edge, defined by ASCE7 for C&C) occurs around 
EF2 wind speed.  In partially enclosed buildings, roof sheathing panels in roof zone 3 often starts 
to come off in EF1 to EF2 wind speeds. 
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Figure 7.6, Component fragility in damage Band 1, partially close building. 
Broken windows and garage door failures were observed in many buildings in damage 
Band 1, which has a major impact on the internal building pressure.  Figure 7.7 shows the 
fragility of roof cover and roof sheathing panels in partially open buildings, in which the mean 
value of internal pressure coefficient changes from 0.15 to 0.46 (Table 7.2).  In partially open 
buildings in damage Band 1, 50% of the roof cover in zone 3 and zone 2 often fails around EF1, 
and 50% of roof sheathing panels in zone 3 and zone 2 fails around EF2 wind speeds.  Recall 
that in damage Band 1, the wind load does not include the effect of vertical wind velocity 
pressure increases. 
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Figure 7.7, Component fragility in damage Band 1, partially open building. 
In damage Band 2, broken windows and garage door failures were observed in most of 
the buildings.  The fragility functions in Figure 7.8 are presented for roof cover and roof 
sheathing panels in roof zone 2 and 3, and garage door windward and leeward walls in partially 
open building in damage Band 2.  Recall that in damage Band 2, calculated wind load includes 
the effect of vertical wind velocity pressure as a result of the high vertical component of wind 
speed in a tornado.  It can be observed from this figure that up to 96% of roof sheathing panels in 
roof zone 3 and 72% of roof sheathing panels in roof zone 2 fail at wind speed EF1 range, much 
higher than 60% of roof sheathing panels in roof zone 3 and 15% roof sheathing panels in roof 
zone 3 in buildings in damage Band 1.  For wind load in damage Band 2, the factor Kc was taken 
as a uniformly distributed random variable range from 1.4 to 1.8. 
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Figure 7.8, Component fragility in damage Band 2, partially open building. 
Because of the higher vertical wind speed component in damage Band 3, in wind load 
calculations, the factor Kc was taken as a uniformly distributed random variable with a range 
from 1.8 to 2.4.  Figure 7.9 shows the fragility function for components of partially open 
buildings in damage Band 3.  It can be seen in Figure 7.9 that at EF1, almost 100% of roof 
sheathing panels in roof zone 3, and up to 93% of roof sheathing panels in roof zone 2 failed.  
These values were also higher than those of buildings in damage Band 2.  It should be noted that 
garage doors designed for straight wind speed of 140 mph (Figure 7.6) would fail at tornado 
wind speed of EF1 to EF2. 
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Figure 7.9, Component fragility in damage Band 3, partially open building. 
It can be seen from the fragility functions presented in Figures 7.6 through 7.9 that with 
the same damage observed, the buildings may experience different lateral wind speeds in 
different damage bands.  The observed damage depends not only on the relative location of the 
buildings to the tornado core, but also the building failure progression. 
7.1.4 Fragility Analysis Conclusions  
Analysis of building damage patterns after the May 20, 2013 Moore, Oklahoma tornado 
showed that the failure progression of residential structures within a tornado wind field depends 
on the relative location and orientation of the house to the tornado track.  Specifically, if similar 
damage is observed, two different structures may have experience different wind speeds if 
located at different relative distances from the center-line of a tornado track.  Also, different 
damage levels can be seen for structures at the same relative location to the center-line of a 
tornado.  This can be caused by differences in house orientation (garage door/windows on the 
windward versus leeward side) and/or windborne debris impact, which leads to a change in 
internal wind pressure.  The distance from the centerline of a tornado and the orientation of a 
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building should be considered when making predictions of tornado wind speed from observed 
residential structural damage. 
7.2 Using Tornado Damage Surveys to Improve Laboratory Simulations 
Laboratory tornado simulators were developed decades ago to study tornado vortices.  In 
the past ten years, however, laboratory simulators have been employed for the new task of 
estimating tornado-induced wind loading on structures.  If some structures are to be designed to 
withstand tornado wind loads, the mechanisms and magnitudes of these loads must be 
understood.  To design a safer home, to design a tornado-resistant hospital or power plant, to 
design safe buildings, a laboratory simulator with model structures can be used to estimate wind 
loads.  While several facilities for conducting such work are operational or in various stages of 
development around the world (at Texas Tech: Mishra et al. (2008), in Canada: Natarajan and 
Hangan (2012), and in Japan: Sabareesh et al. (2012)), this section summarizes a comparison of 
the tornado damage observed in Moore to the residential building loads measured at Iowa State 
University.  More details of the work from Iowa State can be found in Haan et al. (2010).  
Validating such a facility is a challenge due to the difficult and dangers of placing 
instrumentation in the path of a tornado vortex.  Ideally validation would consist of an 
instrumented house or other structure being hit with a tornado.  Since this is nearly impossible 
from a practical standpoint, other validation approaches must be employed.  Past validation 
attempts have been made using radar data and ground pressure data (see Haan et al. 2008).  Geo-
located structural damage data from an event such as the Moore tornado presents another 
validation possibility.  This section of the overall report compares laboratory estimates of 
tornado-induced loading with structural damage observed in Moore with the purpose of 
improving such simulations for the future. 
This section is organized into three subsections.  The first summarizes the experimental 
approach of the laboratory tornado simulator, the second summarizes the character of tornado-
induced wind loading and the scaling required to relate the laboratory to the field, and the third 
subsection discusses the comparisons between the Moore damage and the laboratory estimates. 
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7.2.1 Details of the Experimental Approach 
The experimental approach involved use of the tornado simulator at Iowa State 
University.  This section will describe the simulator, the gable-roof model used in these tests, and 
the test conditions included in this analysis. 
Tornado Simulator Facility 
Iowa State University houses a tornado simulator that was conceived and built for testing 
model structures in tornado-like vortex flows.  The facility consists of a 6 ft (1.83m) diameter fan 
surrounded by an 18 ft (5.49m) annular duct.  The fan is fixed in the middle of the facility and 
draws air upward.  This upward flow is redirected back downward through the annular duct.  The 
downward flow is given rotation with adjustable guide vanes.  The rotating inflow forms a vortex 
beneath the fan near the updraft.  This vortex-generation mechanism is qualitatively similar to 
that of full-scale tornadoes.  The fan and duct system is mounted on an overhead crane to allow 
the vortex to translate past models that are mounted on a ground plane beneath the system.  
Figure 7.10 shows the system in the laboratory.  Further details of the facility development are 
described in Haan et al. (2008). 
 
Figure 7.10, Tornado/Microburst Simulator at Iowa State University 
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Gable-Roof Building Model 
The building model used in these tests was fabricated from acrylic and had plan 
dimensions (D) of 91mm by 91mm (3.6 in. by 3.6 in.).  The eave height was 36mm with a 
maximum roof height (H) of 66mm (2.6 in.).  The gable roof angle was 35°.  The model is 
shown in Figure 7.11 and was fitted with 89 pressure taps.  These taps were connected by plastic 
tubing to a Scanivalve electronic pressure scanner and a PC.  All signals were corrected for the 
dynamic effects of the tubing. The building model itself is rigid and did not simulate any 
dynamic effects. 
Figure 7.12 shows the numbering system for the pressure taps on the building as well as 
the coordinate system.  All vortices travel from the negative to positive x-direction and approach 
the building at an angle, 𝜃, as indicated.  All vortices rotate counter-clockwise. 
 
 
Figure 7.11, Gable-roof building model used in the tornado simulator tests. 
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Figure 7.12, Building model schematic showing pressure tap numbering, the x and y direction 
definitions, and the approach angle (𝜽) definition. The large arrows indicate the translation and 
rotation directions of the vortex; the vortex translated through the center of the building for all 
tests.  
Test Conditions 
The building model has been tested in a range of vortex conditions.  Vortex structure and 
size, vortex translation speed and vortex approach angle have all been varied.  Table 7.3 
summarizes the two vortex configurations that were included in this damage comparison—both 
the largest and the smallest swirl ratio vortices that the simulator can generate.  The swirl ratio is 
a relative measure of rotation and axial flow rate through a vortex.  Changing the swirl ratio 
changes both the radius and the structure of the vortex.  More details on swirl ratio can be found 
in Haan et al. (2008).  The vortex translation speed for this test was 0.5 ft/sec (0.15 m/s) and the 
approach angle (at which the vortex approached the building) of 0°.  In the future, more 
conditions might be considered to statistically bracket the range, but this limited data set was 
chosen to simplify this first validation attempt. 
Velocity measurements on these vortices were performed using a TFI Cobra probe 
located at the same position as the model but with the model absent.  A 3-sec. averaging time 
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was used to quantify the gust velocities in the vortex as it translated past the building model 
location.  Table 7.3 shows the maximum 3-sec. horizontal velocities acquired in these tests.  
These velocities were used to scale the measured wind loads to full scale.  More details on 
velocity measurements can be found in Fleming et al. (2013).  These velocities were also used 
(along with the building height) to estimate the Reynolds numbers of the building model tests.  
In this project, the Re values ranged from 3.9×105 to 5.2×105—it has conventionally been 
assumed that sharp-edged bluff body flows are relatively independent of Re effects for Re 
greater than ~3×104. 
Table 7.3, Parameters for the tornado-like vortex used in the project. 𝐑𝐜 is the 
radius of the vortex at the location of maximum tangential wind speed, Re is the Reynolds 
number based on building height, and 𝐑𝐜 𝐃⁄  is the ratio of the vortex radius to the building 
plan dimension. 
Vortex Type 
𝑽𝑯𝒎𝒂𝒙 
(m/s) 
Swirl ratio 
𝑹𝒄 
(m) 
Re 𝑹𝒄 𝑫⁄  
V15 8.87 0.08 0.18 3.9×105 2.0 
V55 11.86 1.14 0.51 5.2×105 5.6 
7.2.2 Character of Tornado-Induced Loading 
This section describes the character of tornado-induced loading while the next section 
describes how loads measured in the lab can be extrapolated to full-scale values.  One way to 
conceive of the mechanism of tornado-induced pressures on a building is to think of pressures 
being generated both from the typical effects of wind and from the effect of the negative static 
pressure that is generated in the core of a tornado vortex.  The effect of the static pressure drop in 
the core can be seen from any of the pressure time series from these tests.  They all have a 
similar large drop right as the vortex passes.  Example pressure signals are shown in Figure 7.13 
from a wall tap and from a roof tap.  These examples with the large pressure drop are typical of 
every pressure tap.  
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Figure 7.13, Example time series from a wall pressure tap and a roof pressure tap showing the 
large drop in pressure that occurs as the vortex passes the building. The large arrows indicate 
the direction of translation and rotation of the vortex. 
The effect of the wind can be seen fairly clearly in the integrated forces.  When pressure 
signals like those shown in Figure 7.13 are integrated over the building surface, forces can be 
estimated.  Figure 7.14 shows coefficients for three components of force as the tornado vortex 
passes the building.  As the leading edge of the vortex core interacts with the building, the 
building is pushed in the +y direction.  As the trailing edge of the core passes, the building is 
pushed in the –y direction.  The large uplift force (+z) shown in the figure is generated by the 
static pressure drop in the core.  
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Figure 7.14, Overall tornado-induced forces estimated from integrating pressures about the 
building model. The effect of the wind velocity can be seen most clearly by looking at 𝑪𝑭𝒚. Just 
before the vortex center hits the building (negative value of x/D), the vortex velocity pushes the 
building in the positive y-direction. Just after the vortex passes, the vortex velocity pushes in the 
negative y-direction. 
7.2.3 Scaling Laboratory Data to Full Scale 
Estimating full scale wind forces from laboratory measurements relies on the assumption 
that the force coefficients at full-scale and at model scale are equivalent as shown in Eq. (7.4) 
below.  The subscripts “fs” and “m” stand for “full scale” and “model,” respectively. 
 𝐶𝐹𝑓𝑠 = 𝐶𝐹𝑚 (7.4) 
These coefficients can be expressed in terms of forces, 𝐹, velocities, 𝑉, and areas, 𝐴, as: 
 𝐹𝑓𝑠
𝑉𝑓𝑠
2 𝐴𝑓𝑠
= 𝐹𝑚
𝑉𝑚2𝐴𝑚
 
(7.5) 
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If equation (7.5) is rearranged as follows, the full-scale force estimate can then be 
expressed in terms of the length and velocity scales (𝜆𝐿 and 𝜆𝑉, respectively) as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑓𝑠 = 𝐹𝑚 𝑉𝑓𝑠2𝑉𝑚2 𝐴𝑓𝑠𝐴𝑚 = 𝐹𝑚 1𝜆𝑉2 1𝜆𝐿2 (7.6) 
The forced measured in the wind tunnel is a function of the radial distance, 𝑟, from the 
center of the vortex.  𝐹𝑚 represents the vector sum of the three components of force on the 
building model as shown in Eqn. (7.7).  
 
𝐹𝑚(𝑟) = �𝐹𝑥2(𝑟) + 𝐹𝑦2(𝑟) + 𝐹𝑧2(𝑟) (7.7) 
The length and velocity scales were found from the parameters of the Moore tornado 
itself.  The length scale was estimated by examining a plot of assessed damage level versus 
distance from the center of the vortex.  It was assumed that the worst damage would occur within 
the radius of maximum wind speed—the edge of the “core” of the vortex.  Therefore, the mean 
distance to the EF4 damage was used as the core radius for the Moore tornado.  This distance 
was 490 ft (149m).  Calculating a length scale, 𝜆𝐿, between the size of the Moore vortex and the 
size of the laboratory V55 vortex produces a value of 1/295.  At this scale, the building model 
represents something like a large industrial building or an apartment building. 
The velocity scale was found by comparing the Moore vortex peak speed to the 
maximum horizontal velocity peak measured in the laboratory.  The peak Moore wind speed was 
reported to be 210 mph (94 m/s)—as discussed in Chapter 1—and the laboratory peak was 11.86 
m/s as shown in Table 7.3.  This results in a velocity scale, 𝜆𝑉, of 1/7.5.  
An example plot of 𝐹𝑓𝑠(𝑟) computed with Eqn (7.6) for one simulator trial is shown in 
Figure 7.15.  A total of ten simulator trials were conducted for this case, and data from all ten 
trials were included in the statistics discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 7.15, Example of full-scale tornado-induced wind loading (𝑭𝒎(𝒓)) estimated from 
laboratory measurements.  The incidence angle is 0° and the vortex type was V55.  This example 
represents one of ten runs conducted at this condition. 
7.2.4 Comparison between Field Damage Data and Laboratory Estimates 
This section presents a comparison between the full-scale force estimates that were 
derived from laboratory measurements and the damage assessments performed in Moore.  The 
section describes the data reduction procedure followed to make a reasonable comparison 
between the two, and it discusses the comparison itself and what implications it might have for 
how we interpret the laboratory simulations.  
EF ratings from the 20 May 2013 Moore tornado were plotted as a function of distance 
from the center of the vortex.  These ratings are shown in Figure 7.16.  To compare force 
prediction data sets (such as the example shown in Figure 7.15) with the EF ratings assessed 
from the Moore damage surveys, some data reduction was conducted to make sense of the 
comparison.  First, statistics were computed for each distance from the vortex center—
specifically, from all 10 runs of the simulator, the mean, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile 
forces were calculated.   
Second, it should be noted that a fragility curve type of relationship between forces and 
damage was not used in this case.  Rather the force data were normalized such that the largest of 
these mean forces was given an EF rating of 4.  This normalization makes an implicit assumption 
that the largest forces measured in the lab corresponded to the largest damage observed in the 
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field.  
 
Figure 7.16, EF ratings from 20 May 2013, Moore tornado plotted against distance from vortex 
center. The symbols represent the mean distance for a given rating while the left and right ends 
of the lines represent 25th and 75th percentile distances. 
The comparison is shown in Figure 7.17.  The laboratory prediction does not decay quite 
as quickly as the field data, but the comparison is reasonable.  The lab predictions shown are 
from a V55 vortex rather than the V15 vortex.  The V55 vortex has a higher swirl ratio than V15, 
and therefore the V55 vortex has a two-celled structure while the V15 is single-celled.  The fact 
that the comparison between Moore and V55 was better than the comparison between Moore and 
V15 might be an indication that the Moore tornado vortex was a two-celled or multi-celled 
vortex.  Confirmation of this typically requires mobile radar data from the storm and some extra 
analysis.  Unfortunately, these are not available for Moore. 
This analysis highlights the promise of laboratory simulation—the shape of the curves is 
reasonably consistent, but it also highlights the need for a rational connection between predicted 
forces and resulting damage.  The lab simulator can produce force predictions relatively easily, 
but estimating the resulting damage statistics requires a probabilistic framework involving 
fragility curves—something that builds on the innovative concepts found in van de Lindt et al. 
(2013). 
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Figure 7.17, Comparison of Moore damage assessments (in red) with laboratory predictions (in 
black) from a V55 type vortex. The red symbols represent the mean distance for a given rating 
while the left and right ends of the red lines represent 25th and 75th percentile distances. The 
solid black line represents the mean EF prediction for each distance while the upper and lower 
dashed lines represent the 75th and 25th percentiles of these predictions. 
7.2.5 Tornado Simulator Conclusions 
Based on the observations made in Moore, OK, laboratory simulations, and similar 
observations made after the Tuscaloosa, AL and Joplin, MO tornados the following conclusions 
are advanced.   
• The comparison between the damage data from the Moore tornado and the total force 
predictions from the laboratory tornado simulator shows promise for lab simulations.  
Although the lab simulator over predicted the damage for most radial positions, the 
shapes of the curves were reasonably consistent with each other. 
• Improvements in the comparison between the lab force predictions and the damage 
survey results could be made with a more rational connection between predicted forces 
and resulting damage.  This type of connection could be found using a probabilistic 
framework involving fragility curves. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions and Recommendations  
The inspection team that visited Moore after the May 20th 2013 tornado contained experts 
in many different areas of science and engineering.  For this reason, results of the investigation 
were comprehensive as well as technically detailed.  As stated in the executive summary and 
introduction, target goals of the trip included describing a methodology for an easily 
reproducible rapid damage assessment, assessing performance of building components and storm 
shelters, analyzing how social media can positively impact communities in the wake of extreme 
events, and conducting specialized depth studies.  The results of this report include: 
• A geolocation data methodology has been developed and tested for use by extreme event 
damage assessment teams to collect, attribute, store, and distribute perishable damage 
data.  Through a GIS internet portal, data and team findings are available for public 
viewing as well as analysis by members of the team or other experts interested in tornado 
damage data.  The collection of LiDAR point cloud data in the aftermath of an extreme 
event provides a robust 3D data set that can be used to analyze structural damage even 
after a site has been cleaned up.  
• Active social media data collection produced usable results.  News reporters and storm 
chasers were obtaining and disseminating the most images in Moore.  When approached, 
these professional shared tweets and images, as well as to disseminate the request to their 
followers, which grew the tweet count and useful images.  This led to the conclusion that 
for future studies, citizen sensor requests should be directed to and disseminated through 
news reporters and storm chasers, as well as other “experts” involved with extreme 
events.  Such groups include structural engineers, professional photographers, 
amateur/ham radio operators, and storm spotters. 
• An analysis of storm shelter performance was conducted including above and below 
ground shelters.  The results show that no inspected below ground shelters failed from 
perforation or penetration.  Still, these shelters were sometimes found flooded by rain and 
severed water pipes, and in some cases the exits were blocked by debris.  Above ground 
shelters also performed well, but one shelter was found to have been perforated by two 
metal poles.  This was likely caused by poor consolidation of concrete between the foam 
forms due to the presence of plastic cross ties.  In addition, examination of shared shelter 
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use showed that many residents of Moore took refuge in neighbors’ shelters, and in some 
cases neighbors who were out of town left their shelter unlocked so that neighbors could 
access them.  
• Residential structure damage patterns were examined and it was found that damage often 
initiated at garage doors and typically occurred at connections.  Wall to foundation 
connections found in homes built since the 1999 tornado typically had more anchor bolts.  
Roof-to-wall connections were often toenailed and were observed to commonly fail.  
Failure of light-gage metal garage doors, particularly on garages that extended out from 
the house, typically led to pressurization of the garage, subsequent loss of roof over the 
garage, and collapse of the garage walls.   
• The comparison between the damage data from the Moore, Oklahoma tornado of May 
20th, 2013 and total force predictions from the laboratory tornado simulator shows 
promise for lab simulations.  Although the lab simulator overpredicted the damage for 
most radial positions, the shapes of the curves were reasonably consistent with each 
other.  Improvements in the comparison between the lab force predictions and the 
damage survey results could be made with a more rational connection between predicted 
forces and resulting damage.  This type of connection could be found using a 
probabilistic framework involving fragility curves. 
• Remotely sensed aerial imagery gives a comprehensive understanding of the location and 
extent of the storm, as well as flow and spreading of debris.  These images also allow 
researchers to track long-distance transport of debris.  Using aerial imagery from Moore, 
it was observed that debris flow is typically manifested in “streak lines” spreading out in 
thin lines away from the direction of travel of the storm.  Long-distance debris transport 
showed that most heavy structural debris tends to be carried in the forward direction of 
the storm path.   
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Appendix 
Table A1, Detailed results of building damage assessment and EF rating 
House 
ID1 
Damage Metrics 
Expected 
Wind 
Speed 
(mph) 
EF 
Rating 
Loss of 
roof or 
wall 
covering 
Broken 
glasses 
Failure 
of 
garage 
doors 
and 
walls 
Uplift of 
roof 
decks 
Failure of 
large 
section 
of roofs 
Failure of 
some 
exterior 
walls 
Failure 
of some 
interior 
walls 
Failure 
of all 
walls 
Slab 
swept 
clean 
1          65 EF0 
2  *        79 EF0 
3  *        79 EF0 
4 * *        96 EF1 
5          65 EF0 
6  * * * * *    120 EF2 
7 * * * *      100 EF1 
8 * * * * *     125 EF2 
9  * * * * *    135 EF2 
10 * *  * *     125 EF2 
11 * * * * * * * * * 170 EF4 
12 * * * * * * *   150 EF3 
13 * * * * *     140 EF2 
14 * * * * *     130 EF2 
15 * * * * * *    135 EF2 
16 * * * * * * *   150 EF3 
17 * * * * * * * *  152 EF3 
18 * * * * * * * *  152 EF3 
19 * * * * * * * * * 170 EF4 
20 * * * * * * * * * 170 EF4 
21 * * * * * * * * * 170 EF4 
22 n/a2 *        79 EF0 
23 * *  * * *    120 EF2 
24 n/a2 *  *      97 EF1 
25 n/a2 * * *      97 EF1 
26 * * * * * *    140 EF3 
27 * * * * * * *   148 EF3 
28 * * * * * * * *  170 EF4 
29 * * * * * * *   148 EF3 
30 n/a2 * * * * *    130 EF2 
31 n/a2 * * *  *    125 EF2 
32 * * *       100 EF1 
33 * * *       100 EF1 
34 * * * * *     125 EF2 
35 * * * * *     125 EF2 
36 * *  *      115 EF1 
37 * * * * * *    132 EF2 
38 * * * * * *    132 EF2 
39 * * * * * * * *  152 EF3 
40 * * * * * * *   150 EF3 
41 * * * * * * *   150 EF3 
42 n/a2 *        100 EF1 
43 n/a2 * *       85 EF0 
 1 House IDs are based on those shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 
2 Unable to identify the loss of covering material due to lack of color information 
 
